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THE LOCAL RULES OF PATENT PROCEDURE
Megan M. La Belle†
ABSTRACT
Congress, the Executive, and the Judiciary have all had “patent litigation
abuse” on their minds recently. The concern is that too many frivolous
patent suits are being filed and used to extract unwarranted settlements. The
story is that bad actors—patent assertion entities (PAEs) or, more
pejoratively, “patent trolls”—are suing small companies and end users for
patent infringement even though PAEs make no patented products
themselves. Over the past two years, Congress proposed nearly a dozen bills
aimed at curbing patent litigation abuse, the Executive took various antitroll measures, and the Supreme Court decided a pair of cases that make it
easier to shift fees based on patent litigation misconduct.
In the meantime, federal district courts have been addressing the patent
litigation situation for years through procedural reform. Beginning in 2000,
districts started adopting local patent rules to manage patent litigation.
Today, thirty district courts in twenty different states have comprehensive
local patent rules, and many more individual judges have adopted “locallocal” rules or standing orders that apply to patent cases in their courts.
While commentators have generally lauded the efforts of district courts to
manage patent litigation, the consequence is highly divergent patent
practice from one federal district court to the next.
This Article is the first academic treatment of local patent rules to
consider their effect both on patent policy and our federal system of civil
procedure. It argues that the local patent rules movement undermines
policies germane to patent law, particularly uniformity, and transgresses the
trans-territorial and trans-substantive ideals of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Yet, specialized procedural rules appear not only to be the
current reality in patent litigation, but the inevitable future as well. The
Article therefore proposes the promulgation of a national set of procedural
†.
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rules to govern patent litigation—the Federal Rules of Patent Procedure—
which will borrow from and be shaped by the local patent rules experiment.
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INTRODUCTION
More than three decades ago, Congress established the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to restore uniformity to the patent
laws and reduce forum shopping.1 The idea was that litigants would no
longer forum shop because Federal Circuit law would apply to all patent
cases, and any patent appeals would be heard by the centralized court. 2 By
specializing in patents, moreover, the Federal Circuit would develop
expertise in this complicated, yet critically important, area of the law.
Increased uniformity and predictability, it was believed, would strengthen
the patent system and help grow our economy.
From the start of this experiment, it was clear that Congress intended for
Federal Circuit law to govern substantive issues of patent law, such as claim
construction, infringement, and obviousness. The question Congress
apparently failed to anticipate, however, was how to treat procedural issues
that arise in patent cases.3 Should regional circuit law control as in nonpatent cases, or should the Federal Circuit develop its own patent-specific
procedural rules for uniformity’s sake? As other scholars have discussed,
the Federal Circuit has taken a middle ground, applying regional circuit law
to some procedural issues, but often applying its own law to create special
procedures for patent cases.4
Yet, the Federal Circuit is not the only federal court to single out patent
cases for special treatment. With the surge of patent litigation in recent
years, district courts around the country have crafted unique procedural
rules for patent suits.5 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California was the first to adopt local patent rules back in 2000,6 and so far
twenty-nine other districts in twenty states have followed suit. Some courts
have adopted patent rules that require early disclosure of infringement and
validity contentions. Other courts have severely limited patent litigants’
rights to obtain discovery. And still others have implemented mandatory
1.
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2.
See infra Part III.A (discussing Congress’s reasons for establishing the Federal
Circuit).
3.
See Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
overruled on other grounds by Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 763 (1992).
4.
See infra Part III.B (canvassing the scholarship on the Federal Circuit’s choice of law
doctrine).
5.
See Travis Jensen, Local Patent Rules—Patent Rules Made Easy, LOCAL PATENT
RULES, http://www.localpatentrules.com/ (last updated Nov. 2014).
6.
James Ware & Brian Davy, The History, Content, Application and Influence of the
Northern District of California’s Patent Local Rules, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 965, 967 (2009).
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procedures to promote early resolution of these cases through settlement or
summary judgment. On the rare occasion when these local patent rules have
been challenged, the Federal Circuit has consistently upheld them as a
proper exercise of the trial court’s case-management discretion.7
What is more, even in district courts without local patent rules,
specialized procedures often govern patent cases based on standing orders
or agreements of the parties. Standing orders, sometimes referred to as
“local-local rules,”8 are issued by individual judges as opposed to the
district court as a whole. Local-local patent rules may address a few isolated
aspects of patent litigation or they may provide an entire set of procedural
rules to govern patent cases.9
Since the local patent rules movement began more than a decade ago, it
has garnered some attention. For the most part, though, commentators have
focused on the intricacies of the rules, their pragmatic costs and benefits,
and the near-term impact of the rules on patent litigation.10 This Article, on
the other hand, explores the normative implications of local patent rules,
contextualizing them within the framework of both patent law policy and
federal procedure. Viewed through that lens, I conclude that the
consequence of local patent rules is highly fragmented patent practice from
one federal district court to the next.11 I argue that, in their current form,
local patent rules not only work against the underlying objectives of the
Federal Circuit—to promote uniformity in patent law and reduce forum
shopping—but also undermine the trans-territorial and trans-substantive
nature of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.12
To be sure, local patent rules have served important purposes. For one,
local patent rules signal a lacuna in the current procedural framework for

7.
See, e.g., O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 2006); see also Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 289 F.3d 761, 774 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
But see infra note 215 (discussing recent case related to local patent rules where Federal Circuit
reversed for abuse of discretion).
8.
Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 56 (1997) [hereinafter
Carrington, Renovating Discovery].
9.
See infra Part III.B.
10. See, e.g., Arthur Gollwitzer III, Local Patent Rules—Certainty and Efficiency or a
Crazy Quilt of Substantive Law?, 13 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GRPS. 94, 94 (2012);
Pauline M. Pelletier, The Impact of Local Patent Rules on Rate and Timing of Case Resolution
Relative to Claim Construction: An Empirical study of the Past Decade, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L.
451, 455 (2013); Ware & Davy, supra note 6, at 967.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part IV. Trans-substantivity refers to the principle that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure apply to all civil cases regardless of the underlying substance of the claims, and
trans-territoriality means that the same rules apply regardless of the location of the federal court.
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patent cases.13 Claim construction, the process by which district courts
define disputed patent terms, provides a useful example. In Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., the Supreme Court held that claim construction
is a matter of law that must be determined by the district court.14 Neither the
Supreme Court nor the Federal Circuit have provided any guidance on the
procedure for claim construction, however, leaving district courts to fend
for themselves.15 Consequently, district courts have served as laboratories,
testing different procedures for claim construction and an array of other
matters in patent cases.
This Article urges the beginning of the end of the local patent rules
movement and lays out a proposal for transitioning from disparate,
balkanized local patent rules to a unified set of Federal Rules of Patent
Procedure. Although substance-specific procedural rules may be less than
ideal, circumstances suggest they are the inevitable future for patent
litigation. First, a substantial portion of district courts and district judges
already utilize special procedural rules for patent cases, so abandoning local
patent rules altogether seems unrealistic.16
Second, and perhaps more importantly, lawmakers are focused on patent
litigation, suggesting an open policy window and a real opportunity for
reform.17 In 2011, Congress established the Patent Pilot Program “to
encourage enhancement of expertise in patent cases among district
judges.”18 Two years later, the House passed the Innovation Act—
legislation aimed at curbing PAEs and “patent litigation abuse.”19 Although
the Innovation Act was tabled in the Senate last spring, Representative
Goodlatte recently reintroduced the bill.20 And with the shift in power as a
result of the mid-term elections, patent litigation reform has been declared a
high priority for the current Congress.21
13. Lee H. Rosenthal, The Summary Changes That Weren’t, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 471, 484
(2012) [hereinafter Rosenthal, Summary Changes] (“Such a patchwork of local rules in an area
that the national rules occupy may . . . indicate deficiencies in the national rule.”).
14. 517 U.S. 370, 372, 391 (1996).
15. See Ballard Med. Prods. v. Allegiance Healthcare Corp., 268 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (“Markman does not require a district court to follow any particular procedure in
conducting claim construction.”).
16. See Jensen, supra note 5 (listing the districts with local patent rules).
17. See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES & PUBLIC POLICIES 1, 165–67 (2d
ed. 2011).
18. See infra Part V.B (detailing the Patent Pilot Program).
19. See infra Part V.B (discussing the patent reform proposals before Congress).
20. Press Release, Rep. Bob Goodlatte, Goodlatte Introduces Patent Litigation Reform Bill
(Feb. 5, 2015), available at http://goodlatte.house.gov/press_releases/660.
21. See, e.g., Ashby Jones, Patent Reform Bill Arises Again in Congress, WALL ST. J. L.
BLOG (Feb. 5, 2015, 12:42 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2015/02/05/patent-reform-bill-arisesagain-in-congress/.
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Although these efforts address some of the shortcomings in patent
litigation, they give short shrift to local patent rules and the integral role
they play in patent disputes today.22 For example, the Innovation Act
heightens the pleading standard for patent cases and bifurcates discovery,
but is silent as to how these new procedures will interact with local patent
rules.23 This Article thus suggests a different path than what Congress is
contemplating: comprehensive national patent procedural reform that is
informed by and benefits from the local patent rules experiment.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I discusses the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the transformation of federal civil
litigation over the past seventy-five years. Part II turns to local rules and
examines various factors that have contributed to their proliferation. Part III
shifts to patent litigation and addresses the current crisis of confidence in
the system and the spread of local patent rules, beginning with the Northern
District of California. Part IV explores the effect of local patent rules on our
patent system and our system of federal civil procedure. Finally, Part V
proposes the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Patent Procedure. While
contravening the trans-substantive principle of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a national set of patent rules will enhance uniformity and
predictability and improve the overall quality of patent litigation in the
future.
I.

THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

The year before last marked the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).24 The adoption of the FRCP has been
described as “revolutionary,”25 a “formidable accomplishment,”26 and even
“an epoch-making event in the history of jurisprudence.”27 For a time, the
Rules were heralded for their many achievements: trans-substantivity,28

22.
23.
24.

Id.
Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015).
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 111TH CONG., FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE,
at
vii
(Comm.
Print
2010),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rulesandpolicies/rules/2010%20rules/civil%20procedure.pdf.
25. Armistead M. Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REV. 261, 275
(1939).
26. Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
494, 494 (1986) [hereinafter Resnik, Failing Faith].
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 20 (West 1954); Alexander Holtzoff, A Judge Looks at the Rules after
Fifteen Years of Use, 15 F.R.D. 155, 155 (1954).
28. Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the
Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 75.
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trans-territoriality,29 the merger of law and equity,30 simplified pleading,31
liberal joinder,32 expansive discovery,33 summary judgment,34 and the
creation of a class action device.35 The Rules were viewed as an equalizing
force; they were party and claim neutral and leveled the playing field for
contesting litigants.36
Yet, as the complexion of federal civil litigation changed, the Rules
came under attack. Critics directed their complaints principally at the
FRCP’s framework for pleading and discovery, which purportedly allowed
for exploitation and manipulation of the civil justice system.37 This criticism
has provoked various responses over the past several decades, including
amendments to the FRCP, judicial rulemaking, and—most germane to this
Article—the proliferation of local rules.
A.

Adoption of the FRCP

The adoption of the FRCP in 1938 did not come easily: it was preceded
by twenty-five years of debate over what rules and procedures should
govern in federal court.38 The crux of the disagreement was whether to
continue the practice of “conformity,” whereby district courts applied the
same procedures as the states in which they sat, or whether to shift to a
national set of rules to uniformize practice across the federal court system.39
The nationalists ultimately prevailed, and Congress passed the Rules

29. Samuel P. Jordan, Local Rules and the Limits of Trans-Territorial Procedure, 52 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 415, 421 (2010).
30. RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 22
(Foundation Press 5th ed. 1984).
31. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2238 (1989).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Benjamin Kaplan, A Toast, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1879, 1880 (1989).
35. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class
Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 695 (1941).
36. Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the
Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 310
(2013) [hereinafter Miller, Simplified Pleading]; Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to
Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 102 (2010).
37. Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 26, at 529.
38. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 910 (1987) [hereinafter
Subrin, Equity].
39. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of the Federal Rules,
46 MERCER L. REV. 757, 757 (1995).
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Enabling Act of 1934 authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate the
FRCP.40
While a detailed discussion of all the FRCP’s accomplishments is
beyond the scope of this Article, a few are of particular import. Let’s start
with trans-substantivity, which refers to the principle that the same
procedural rules “apply to all lawsuits regardless of the substance of the
underlying claims.”41 Several factors influenced the rules’ framers’ decision
to make the FRCP trans-substantive. First, trans-substantivity is simple, and
an overarching goal of the Rules was to simplify federal civil practice. 42
Second, trans-substantivity instantiates the belief of the rules’ framers that
“procedure is materially distinct from substantive law.”43 Finally, and
perhaps most significantly, trans-substantive rules are insulated from
political pressure in a way that substance-specific rules are not.44
Closely related to trans-substantivity is trans-territoriality—a doctrine
that requires the same rules to be applied despite differences in location. 45
The framers of the FRCP favored trans-territoriality over localism for two
primary reasons: equality and efficiency. Trans-territoriality fosters equality
because it subjects civil litigants to the same rules of practice whether they
are in federal court in Alaska, Massachusetts, Florida, or Arizona. 46 As for
efficiency, trans-territorial rules facilitate national law practice which
benefits lawyers who can more easily navigate the federal courts across
jurisdictions, as well as clients who no longer have to retain multiple
lawyers in nationwide litigation.47

40. Subrin, Equity, supra note 38; see also infra Part V (laying out the process for
adopting and amending the FRCP).
41. E.g., J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713,
1768 (2012).
42. Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on
Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 383 (2010) (“[T]he
whole atmosphere in which the Enabling Act was passed was infused with talk of simplicity.”).
43. Id. at 382.
44. See id. at 384; Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded
Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 2067, 2074–75 (1989); David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of TransSubstantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 374 (2010).
45. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 29, at 416. Trans-territoriality includes both interdistrict
court uniformity and intrastate uniformity. See Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules,
and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 1999, 2006 (1989) [hereinafter Subrin, Federal Rules].
46. Jordan, supra note 29, at 428 (“The conformity regime meant that parallel cases were
often subject to substantially different procedures, and these procedural variations could often
directly lead to variations in case outcomes.”).
47. Id. at 427–30.
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The final hallmarks of the FRCP that deserve mention are simplified
pleadings and expansive discovery, which worked hand in hand with each
other.48 Earlier procedural regimes were plagued by rigidity and precision,
with pleadings being rejected (and cases dismissed) for technical defects.49
The rule makers wished instead for cases to be decided on their merits; to
that end, they implemented notice pleading and broad discovery. 50 The idea
was that parties would not have to include details in their pleadings, but
could rely on discovery to uncover the relevant facts. Not only was this type
of procedural system supposed to lead to better, merit-based resolutions, it
was expected to increase efficiency too:
It is probable that no procedural process offers greater
opportunities for increasing the efficiency of the administration of
justice than that of discovery before trial. Much of the delay in the
preparation of a case, most of the lost effort in the course of the
trial, and a large part of the uncertainty in the outcome, result from
the want of information on the part of litigants and their counsel as
to the real nature of the respective claims and the facts upon which
they rest.51

The suggestion that expansive discovery improves the efficiency of
litigation would be met with considerable skepticism today. This is not to
say the framers of the FRCP were entirely wrongheaded, only that the
nature of federal civil litigation has undergone a fundamental change over
the past seventy-five years.
B.

Modern Federal Civil Litigation

When the FRCP were adopted in the 1930s, typical federal litigation
involved private law disputes between individuals or businesses for money
damages.52 Of course, these were not the only cases on the federal docket:
courts also heard admiralty cases, intellectual property cases, and cases

48. Martin H. Redish, Pleading, Discovery, and the Federal Rules: Exploring the
Foundations of Modern Procedure, 64 FLA. L. REV. 845, 870 (2012).
49. Miller, Simplified Pleading, supra note 36, at 288–89.
50. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957).
51. Edson R. Sunderland, Foreword to GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL,
at iii (Callaghan & Co., 1932).
52. See Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 26, at 508; see also Abram Chayes, The Role of
the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1285 (1976) (“[T]he courts could
be seen as an adjunct to private ordering, whose primary function was the resolution of disputes
about the fair implications of individual interactions.”).
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where the United States was a party.53 Yet, the paradigm of private damage
actions appears to have been at the forefront of the rule makers’ minds
when establishing the procedural model of the FRCP.54 Tenets like notice
pleading and liberal discovery made good sense for these relatively simple
and straightforward lawsuits.55
The 1950s, however, marked the beginning of a sea change in our federal
civil system with public law or structural litigation emerging as a new form
of adjudication.56 Unlike private law disputes, public law litigation was
“sprawling and amorphous.”57 It involved injunctive and other types of
equitable relief, and impacted many parties not before the court.58 One of
the earliest and best examples of public law litigation is the NAACP’s
structural challenge to segregated public schools that culminated in the
Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education.59
But structural litigation is not the only reason for this alteration of the
federal docket over the past seventy-five years. The intervening decades
have witnessed the emergence of the regulatory state and a proliferation of
new federal laws, many of which provide private causes of action.60 The
upshot has been a dramatic increase not only in the sheer number of cases
filed in federal court, but in their complexity and duration as well.61 Civil
rights, environmental, securities, and toxic tort cases—which were either
extremely rare or unheard of when the FRCP were adopted—are
commonplace in federal litigation today.62
53. See Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 26, at 510–11; Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal,
Procedural Mismatches, and Civil Rights Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 157, 159
(2010) [hereinafter Wasserman, Iqbal].
54. See Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 26, at 512.
55. See Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access,
94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 896 (2009) [hereinafter Bone, Twombly] (“It would have made sense in
this earlier world to assume relatively manageable discovery and trial costs for most cases.”);
Wasserman, Iqbal, supra note 53, at 159 (“The litigation regime established by the Rules and
Conley v. Gibson . . . made sense in these relatively straightforward, single-occurrence, fewparty cases.”).
56. See Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41, 48
(2012). As originally conceived, public law was “the body of law dealing with the relations
between private individuals and the government, and with the structure and operation of the
government itself.” Id.
57. Chayes, supra note 52, at 1302.
58. Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 270, 279–80 (1989).
59. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
60. See Gil Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a Franchise: Rethinking Justifications for
Federal Question Jurisdiction, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 95, 125 (2009).
61. See id.
62. Jay Tidmarsh, Civil Procedure: The Last Ten Years, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 503, 505
(1996); Wasserman, Iqbal, supra note 53, at 160. Other factors contributing to federal courts’
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Finally, in some ways, it is the Rules themselves that have effected this
transformation of federal litigation. Some of the most complicated and timeconsuming cases that federal courts hear today are class action suits—a
procedural device codified and expanded by the FRCP.63 Indeed, Congress
recently expanded federal jurisdiction over class actions even further, so
that most class action lawsuits are now heard by federal courts even if based
on state law.64 Relatedly, the Rules allow for broad and liberal joinder,
which means that even non-class action lawsuits often involve multiple
parties asserting various federal and state law claims. 65
For better or worse, federal civil dockets today look very different than
in the 1930s. As the landscape of federal civil litigation shifted, the rule
makers’ promises about the benefits of simplified pleading and expansive
discovery rang hollow. Instead, the rising burden and costs of litigation
caused many to question the efficacy, sustainability, and legitimacy of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
C.

Backlash Against the FRCP

Many of the principles embodied by the FRCP have come under attack
over the years, but none more than discovery. Discovery has been the target
of criticism for a variety of reasons. First, as the size and scope of litigation
expanded, so did discovery. Simply put, the more claims, parties, and issues
involved in a case, the more relevant information there is to discover.66
Consequently, parties and courts devote significantly more time and
resources to discovery than the rule makers contemplated.
overcrowded dockets include the federalization of criminal law enforcement and the Speedy
Trial Act, which prioritizes criminal cases over civil cases. See Edward D. Cavanagh, The Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Can Systemic Ills Afflicting the Federal Courts be Remedied by Local Rules?, 67 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 721, 721–22 (1993).
63. Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, The Case-orControversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545,
545–46 (2006).
64. Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006) (expanding diversity
jurisdiction to putative class actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million and
“any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant”).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (allowing federal courts to hear certain state law claims); FED. R.
CIV. P. 18 (joinder of claims); FED. R. CIV. P. 20 (joinder of parties); see also Robin J. Effron,
The Shadow Rules of Joinder, 100 GEO. L.J. 759, 769 (2012) (exploring the importance of
joinder in modern federal civil litigation).
66. See Bone, Twombly, supra note 55, at 896–97 (“There are many more large and
complex lawsuits with high stakes, more large law firms and lawyers practicing nationwide who
have much weaker incentives to build local reputations, and a much wider range of materials
that can be targeted in discovery, including potentially massive electronic records.”).
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Second, advances in technology have impacted discovery in fundamental
ways.67 In the 1930s, computers, fax machines, electronic mail, and the
Internet did not exist, so the notion of broad discovery meant something
very different compared to today. Where document production in a typical
case once consisted of a few thousand pages, it is not unusual for parties to
exchange millions of pages in modern civil litigation.68 But it’s not just the
volume of information that may impose an undue burden; the manner in
which electronic information is maintained and stored also can make it
extremely difficult to produce without substantial effort and cost.69
Finally, critics argue that expansive discovery—especially when coupled
with liberal pleading standards—allows unscrupulous plaintiffs to file
meritless claims, go on “fishing expeditions,” and force defendants to settle
simply to avoid the costs of discovery.70 These frivolous lawsuits provide a
windfall to plaintiffs and distract defendants from their ordinary business
pursuits, or so the story goes.71 Rather than facilitating merits-based
decisions, many believed that liberal discovery contributed in large part to a
litigation “crisis” in the federal courts.72
This perception that federal civil litigation faced a crisis spurred a call
for reform, and lawmakers responded in different ways.73 Beginning in the
1980s, Congress passed various federal statutes aimed at managing the

67. See, e.g., Daniel C. Girard & Todd I. Espinosa, Limiting Evasive Discovery: A
Proposal for Three Cost-Saving Amendments to the Federal Rules, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 473,
476–77 (2010).
68. See, e.g., id. (“With the advent of electronic discovery, a whole new array of
possibilities has arisen . . . [including] burying the propounding party in millions of pages of
irrelevant or duplicative documents.”).
69. See, e.g., Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, No. 05-3091, 2009 WL 3446761, at *1 (D.N.J.
Oct. 20, 2009) (ordering the parties to share the $1 to $1.5 million to produce the archived
emails that plaintiff sought through discovery).
70. See, e.g., Chesbrough v. VPA, P.C., 655 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal
citations omitted) (explaining that FRCP 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard helps to “prevent
fishing expeditions”).
71. See Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil
Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393, 1395–96 (1992) [hereinafter Tobias, Civil Justice Reform]
(explaining that many judges and commentators in the 1970s were concerned about litigation
abuse and meritless suits).
72. See Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 39, at 758–59.
73. Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 26, at 498–99. Not all scholars agreed that our
litigation system actually faced a crisis. See Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 39, at 759
(stating that the question whether federal courts actually faced a litigation crisis is an open one);
Carrington, Renovating Discovery, supra note 8, at 53 (internal citations omitted) (“Much of the
hooplah about litigation costs may be traceable to those whose real complaint is that they or
their clients are exposed to liabilities that they would prefer to avoid. Theirs is a disguised
outcry for tort reform.”).
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litigation crisis facing federal courts.74 Along with these generally
applicable reforms, Congress enacted legislation for certain classes of cases
that supposedly consumed a disproportionate amount of federal courts’
time, namely prisoner and securities cases.75
Between the 1980s and 2000s, the FRCP were amended several times to
limit certain types of discovery, and to provide federal judges with greater
discretion to manage civil litigation.76 Early on, Rule 26 was amended to
grant federal judges ad hoc power to limit overly burdensome or duplicative
discovery.77 Some years later, Rule 16 was amended to grant district judges
broader authority to manage their dockets,78 and Rules 30 and 33 were
amended to presumptively limit parties to twenty-five interrogatories and
each side to ten depositions of seven hours each.79 More recently, the rule
makers overhauled the FRCP to contemplate electronic discovery and cabin
the costs associated with it.80
Together with Congress and the rule makers, federal courts have
undertaken various efforts to address the perceived litigation crisis. To this
end, federal trial judges have become “case managers” who play a much
more active role in lawsuits than in the past. 81 Managerial judges are not
passive umpires, but instead meet with the parties regularly, discuss the
progress of the case, and actively encourage settlement and early resolution
of the matter outside of court.82 Another way many federal judges manage
74. See infra Part II (discussing various reform efforts).
75. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, 132166 to 77 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3601); Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub.
L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in various sections throughout 15 U.S.C. §§ 77–78).
These legislative schemes included various procedural reforms, such as exhaustion requirements
for prisoner suits and heightened pleading requirements for securities cases. See Marcus, supra
note 44, at 404–06.
76. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2); FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (requiring trial judges to hold pre-trial
conferences at which various subjects, including settlement, must be discussed).
77. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (1983) (explaining that the 1983
amendments to Rule 26 were directed as “excessive discovery and evasion or resistance to
reasonable discovery requests”).
78. See Lee H. Rosenthal, From Rules of Procedure to How Lawyers Litigate: ‘Twixt the
Cup and the Lip, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 227, 235 (2010).
79. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30 (limiting sides to ten depositions of seven hours each); FED. R.
CIV. P. 33 (limiting parties to twenty-five interrogatories including subparts). So far document
requests have not been limited, but that is something rulemakers recently considered.
80. See Richard L. Marcus, The 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Governing Discovery of Electronically Stored Information: Fitting Electronic Discovery into
the Overall Discovery Mix, in ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE: CASES AND
MATERIALS, 1, 2–3 (Shira Scheindlin et al. eds., 2009).
81. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 433 (1982).
82. Id. at 377; see also Tobias Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive
Law, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1027, 1027 (2013) (“[T]he figure of the proactive jurist, involved in
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their dockets is through standing or scheduling orders that establish
specialized procedures for different types of cases.83 Finally, apart from
individual judges, district courts as a whole have taken steps to handle
heavy caseloads through the adoption of local rules.
II.

THE LOCAL RULES MOVEMENT

Uniformity was the driving force behind the nationalization of federal
court procedure, and thus principles of trans-substantivity and transterritoriality permeate the FRCP.84 From the start, however, the Rules have
made allowances for localism. While few local rules were adopted during
the initial post-FRCP decades,85 that began to change as the landscape of
federal civil litigation evolved and became more complex.86 By the 1980s,
there was a proliferation of local rules that prompted criticism and calls for
reform.
A.

Proliferation of Local Rules

The adoption of the FRCP marked a shift from conformity with local
rules to a scheme of federal procedure. Still, the original FRCP preserved a
continuing role for local rules, permitting district courts to make and amend
rules governing their practice from time to time.87 The rule makers believed
such a provision was necessary so the FRCP could “be adjusted easily and
without friction to the differing habits and customs of lawyers throughout
the country.”88 Notwithstanding this allowance, local rules activity was
minimal for the first three decades following adoption of the FRCP.89 The
case management from the outset of the litigation and attentive throughout the proceedings to
the impact of her decisions on settlement dynamics—a managerial judge—has displaced the
passive umpire as the dominant paradigm in the federal district courts.”).
83. See Resnik, supra note 81, at 399–400.
84. See supra Part I.A (discussing motivating forces behind FRCP).
85. See Tobias, Civil Justice Reform, supra note 71, at 1394–95.
86. See supra Part I.B (discussing the transformation of federal civil litigation beginning
in the 1950s).
87. 12 CHARLES WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3151 n.1 (2d ed.
1997). Local rules can be adopted by a majority of the district judges on the court.
88. CHARLES CLARK, PROCEEDINGS OF MEETING OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR
CIVIL
PROCEDURE
1515
(Feb.
25,
1936),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV02-1936-min-Vol6.pdf.
89. See Tobias, Civil Justice Reform, supra note 71, at 1394–95 (“The Civil Rules
Committee and the federal judiciary were able to maintain simplicity and uniformity in federal
civil procedure for approximately thirty years after the adoption of the original Federal Rules in
1938.”).
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consensus during that period was that the FRCP were effective and easy to
apply, making local rules unnecessary.90
This began to change in the 1970s with the so-called “explosion” of
federal civil litigation,91 and widespread adoption of local rules by district
courts across the country.92 Local rules were promulgated in large measure
to provide judges with tools for managing their unwieldy civil dockets. 93
While nearly all ninety-four district courts in the country adopted local
rules, there were vast differences among them. The Central District of
California, for example, had hundreds of local rules (including sub-rules),
whereas the Middle District of Georgia had only one.94 Local rules varied
too in subject matter, with some local rules addressing technical matters like
page length and font size, while others administered more substantive
matters such as discovery, alternative dispute resolution (ADR), and jury
composition.95
Despite their time-honored status, the proliferation of local rules drew
sharp criticism. The central critique was that local rules undermine the goal
of national procedural uniformity. Worst case scenario were local rules that
directly conflicted with the FRCP.96 Yet, even local rules that were not
inconsistent with the FRCP were still problematic because they
controverted the trans-territoriality norm of the Rules.97 Critics argued that
this balkanization could disadvantage non-local counsel, lead to forum
shopping, and create unnecessary confusion and expense for attorneys and

90. Id. at 1395.
91. See supra Part I.B (discussing the transformation of federal civil litigation beginning
in the 1950s).
92. See A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1568 (1991) (“Important segments of the bar are most unhappy with Rule
83 and the plethora of local rules that have evolved pursuant to its authority.”); Subrin, Federal
Rules, supra note 45, at 2012 (“This crack in the wall of uniformity has become a gaping
hole.”).
93. See Tobias, Civil Justice Reform, supra note 71, at 1397–98 (“An important means by
which courts accomplished much managerial judging, particularly before 1983, was through the
promulgation of local rules.”).
94. Id. at 1399. Today, the Central District of California remains the leader in number of
local rules, while the Western District of Wisconsin now has the fewest with five.
95. See Levin, supra note 92, at 1574–75.
96. See COMM. ON RULES PRACTICE & PROC. OF THE JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S., REPORT
OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT: LOCAL RULES OF CIVIL PRACTICE (1989) (finding more than 800
instances of “possible inconsistency” with the FRCP). By way of example, nearly every federal
district court had adopted a local rule limiting the number of interrogatories parties could
propound even though FRCP 33 contained no such limitation. See Carrington, Renovating
Discovery, supra note 8, at 57–58.
97. Jordan, supra note 29, at 417.
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parties.98 Maybe most concerning, though, was the potential for fragmented
local rules to impact the substantive rights of civil litigants.99
Local rules were also criticized because of the manner in which they
were promulgated, especially as compared to the FRCP. The FRCP are
adopted and amended through a process established by the Rules Enabling
Act that roughly includes the following steps: (1) new rules and
amendments are drafted by an advisory committee composed of judges,
attorneys, and law professors; (2) the committee’s drafts are circulated to
the bench, bar, and public for comment; (3) the committee considers those
comments and then makes any proposals to the Supreme Court; (4) a
majority of Supreme Court justices decide whether to promulgate the rules;
and (5) if the Court promulgates the rules, Congress has the opportunity to
reject, modify, or defer to them.100 This process has been touted as “perhaps
the most thoroughly open, deliberative, and exacting process in the nation
for developing substantively neutral rules.”101 Local rules, on the other
hand, could be promulgated quite easily by a simple majority of the district
court judges.102
A final criticism concerned the mechanisms for challenging and
reviewing local rules. Appellate review—the usual mechanism for policing
district court decisions—often was not available for local rules, either
because there was no final judgment in the case or because the litigant
chose to comply with the local rule rather than risk losing on appeal.103 And
even in cases where local rules were subjected to review, the appellate court
generally afforded substantial deference to the district court, meaning that
the few local rules that were challenged tended to be upheld.104 The result
was a massive set of local rules that were nearly impossible to police.

98. See, e.g., Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 39, at 759; Robert E. Keeton, The
Function of Local Rules and the Tension with Uniformity, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 853, 860 (1989).
99. Keeton, supra note 98, at 860.
100. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–74 (2012); see also Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal
Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1655, 1656–57 (1995).
101. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS
COMMENTARY 58 (1995). But see Richard D. Freer, The Continuing Gloom About Federal
Judicial Rulemaking, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 447, 448 (2013) (arguing that the process by which
the FRCP are promulgated has been “a source of gloom for more than a generation”).
102. See Daniel R. Coquillette et al., The Role of Local Rules, 75 A.B.A. J. 62, 62 (1989)
(noting that earlier versions of Rule 83 lacked an opportunity for notice and comment).
103. See Levin, supra note 92, at 1576 (“What litigant, what litigator, would willingly
suffer an adverse final judgment by flouting a rule promulgated by the majority of the judges of
the court in which the case is being tried, no matter how clear the inconsistency may appear?”).
104. See, e.g., Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1282–83 (11th Cir. 2011) (stating
that it gives “great deference to a district court’s interpretation of its local rules”); Crowley v.
L.L. Bean, Inc., 361 F.3d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[W]e accord ‘a special degree of deference—
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Efforts to Reform Local Rules

Since the 1980s, various efforts have been made to stem the proliferation
of local rules. For starters, the Judicial Conference of the United States, the
policymaking arm of the federal judiciary, launched the Local Rules Project
(Project) in 1984.105 The Project was an exhaustive, multi-year study of
local rules adopted by district courts across the country.106 The Project
culminated in a report that identified more than 5,000 local rules or standing
orders and more than 800 potential inconsistencies with the FRCP.107
These findings prompted several responses. First, the Judicial
Conference ordered that local rules be made consistent with the FRCP.108
Some, but not all, district courts complied with the order by deleting or
modifying any inconsistent local rules.109 Second, Rule 83—the provision in
the FRCP governing local rules—was amended in 1985 to require
“appropriate public notice of proposed rules and an opportunity to comment
on them.”110 While this certainly improved the process, it was still a
relatively small, insular group of district judges that ultimately made
decisions on local rules.111
Third, Congress enacted the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice
Act (JIA) in 1988.112 Among other things, the JIA required all federal courts
(other than the Supreme Court) to appoint advisory committees to assist in
developing local rules, and assigned circuit judicial councils the task of
policing local rules via periodic review.113 The purpose of the JIA was to
reverse the trend of proliferating local rules and restore the primacy of the

above and beyond the traditional standards of decisionmaking and appellate oversight— . . . to a
court’s interpretation of its own local rules.’”).
105. See Patrick J. Schlitz, Much Ado About Little: Explaining the Sturm Und Drang Over
the Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1436–37 (2005).
106. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROC. ON THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT: LOCAL RULES OF CIVIL PRACTICE (1989).
107. Id.
108. Tobias, Civil Justice Reform, supra note 71, at 1399 & n.40.
109. See id. (stating that there was not substantial nationwide compliance with the Judicial
Conference’s order); Jodi S. Balsam, The New Second Circuit Local Rules: Anatomy and
Commentary, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 469, 481 n.34 (2011) (stating that some district courts voluntarily
modified rules).
110. FED. R. CIV. P. 83 (1985); see also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 705, 708–12
(2010) (per curiam) (emphasizing the role of notice and comment in the promulgation of local
rules).
111. See Jordan, supra note 29, at 433.
112. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642
(1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
113. Id.; see also Gregory C. Sisk, The Balkanization of Appellate Justice: The
Proliferation of Local Rules in the Federal Circuits, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 57 (1997).
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FRCP.114 Yet, the JIA never had the chance to accomplish these goals
because, just two years later, Congress passed the Civil Justice Reform Act,
which worked at cross-purposes with the JIA by encouraging
experimentation at the district court level.115
C.

Civil Justice Reform Act

In 1990, Congress enacted the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) in
response to the perceived litigation crisis in federal courts.116 The CJRA
aspired to reduce costs and eliminate delay in civil litigation by encouraging
experimentation in case management and ADR in district courts.117 The
idea, apparently, was to achieve “bottom up” reform whereby district courts
would devise individual plans for improving the state of litigation.118
To be able to test these new procedures empirically, the CJRA
established both a demonstration program and a pilot program.119 The
demonstration program required five district courts, including the Northern
District of California, to experiment with various case management
procedures such as case tracking and ADR.120 In a similar vein, the pilot
program designated ten “pilot” districts and ten “comparison” districts, each
of which was required to develop a plan for streamlining litigation.121 The
114. Walter W. Heiser, A Critical Review of the Local Rules of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of California, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 560 (1996).
115. Sisk, supra note 113, at 57 (arguing that “Congress’s recent forays into this area [of
local rules] have been schizophrenic”).
116. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–82; Cavanagh, supra note 62, at 722. The CJRA is sometimes
referred to as the “Biden Bill” because then-Senator and now Vice President Biden was the
primary sponsor of the legislation. Id. at 723.
117. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Introduction, 67 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. at i (1993) (stating that the
CJRA “was intended to reverse a recent trend in which one’s bank balance, rather than the
merits of the case, controlled a decision to file suit”).
118. See Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 39, at 765–66.
119. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, tit. I, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 104(c), 104 Stat.
5097.
120. Id. The other four district courts in the demonstration program were the Western
District of Michigan, Northern District of Ohio, Northern District of West Virginia, and
Western District of Missouri. Id.
121. JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE?
AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 3
(Rand
1996),
available
at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR800.pdf. The ten pilot
districts were the Southern District of California, District of Delaware, Northern District of
Georgia, Southern District of New York, Western District of Oklahoma, Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, Western District of Tennessee, Southern District of Texas, District of Utah, and
Eastern District of Wisconsin. Id. at 3. The comparison districts were the District of Arizona,
Central District of California, Northern District of Florida, Northern District of Illinois,
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difference was that the pilot districts had to incorporate certain case
management principles in their plans, while the comparison districts simply
had to develop some type of plan.122 These different programs were
scheduled to run between four and five years.123
It is difficult to say whether the CJRA achieved its objectives of reducing
cost and delay in litigation.124 What’s clear is that the Act led to further
proliferation of local rules and further fragmentation of federal procedure. 125
For instance, several districts approved local rules to encourage settlement,
but their approaches varied dramatically. In some districts, cases were
assigned to a panel of neutral attorneys for evaluation, while other cases
were presented to juries for non-binding decisions.126 District courts also
promulgated a host of local rules relating to discovery and mandatory
disclosures, some of which directly conflicted with the FRCP.127 Finally, as
a result of the CJRA, certain districts adopted specialized procedures—
including rocket dockets and firm trial dates—that have come to play an
important role in patent litigation.128 As a matter of fact, it was participation
Northern District of Indiana, Eastern District of Kentucky, Western District of Kentucky,
District of Maryland, Eastern District of New York, and Middle District of Pennsylvania. Id.
122. Id. The case management principles included: (1) differential case management; (2)
early judicial management; (3) monitoring and control of complex cases; (4) encouragement of
cost-effective discovery through voluntary exchanges and cooperative discovery devices; (5)
good-faith efforts to resolve discovery disputes before filing motions; and (6) referral of
appropriate cases to ADR programs. Id.
123. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 § 104(c).
124. See KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 121, at 1 (finding that “[t]he CJRA pilot program . . .
had little effect on time to disposition, litigation costs, and attorneys’ satisfaction and views of
the fairness of case management”); Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, The Reappearing
Judge, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 849, 870–71 & n.74 (2013) (stating that there’s no empirical
evidence demonstrating whether active case management reduces the costs of litigation).
125. See Balsam, supra note 109, at 481 & n.34; Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 39,
at 764–65 (discussing the fragmentation of process that resulted from the CJRA).
126. Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 39, at 762–63.
127. See, e.g., Carrington, Renovating Discovery, supra note 8, at 57–58 (stating that
almost every district limited the number of interrogatories parties could propound in
contradiction with the FRCP). Indeed, in some instances, districts were clearly aware of these
conflicts with the FRCP. See Lauren Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act
of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1453–54 (1994) (quoting the Eastern District of Texas’ CJRA
plan which provided: “to the extent that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are inconsistent
with this Plan, the Plan has precedence and is controlling”).
128. See, e.g., Carrie E. Johnson, Rocket Dockets: Reducing Delay in Federal Civil
Litigation, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 225, 235 (1997) (discussing the local rules and standing orders
that facilitate the Eastern District of Virginia’s rocket docket); William J. Marsden, Jr. & Robert
M. Oakes, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, 29 DEL. LAW. 18, 22 (2011)
(explaining that, as a pilot district under the CJRA, the District of Delaware adopted local rules
mandating early and firm trial dates that ultimately made it “enormously popular with patent
owners”).
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in the CJRA’s demonstration program that inspired the Northern District of
California to propose and ultimately adopt the first set of local patent
rules.129
III.

PATENT LITIGATION AND PROCEDURE

Patent litigation is nothing new, but it has attracted a lot of attention in
recent years.130 This can be explained, at least in part, by high-profile
lawsuits between giants like Apple and Samsung.131 Yet the principal reason
patent litigation is suddenly newsworthy is because there’s a supposed crisis
that demands reform.132 Much as Congress responded to the litigation
explosion in the 1980s with measures like the JIA and CJRA, Congress has
been considering legislation to curb “patent litigation abuse.”133 Also similar
to the situation thirty years ago, district courts are adopting local rules to
manage the crisis.134 This time, though, the local rules are substance
specific, which raises different and possibly more serious concerns about
their impact not only on federal procedure, but on patent policy too.
A.

Patent Policy and the Federal Circuit

The United States patent system has a storied history, with the strength
of patent rights ebbing and flowing over time.135 The latter half of the
129. See Ware & Davy, supra note 6, at 973–74.
130. When President Reagan signed legislation permitting patent cases to be resolved
through private party arbitration, 35 U.S.C. § 294, he cited the “inordinately high cost of patent
litigation.” Presidential Statement on Signing the Patent and Trademark Office Appropriations
Bill, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. No. 1089 (Aug. 28, 1982).
131. See Jessica E. Vascellaro, Apple and Samsung Trade Jabs in Court, WALL ST. J., July
31, 2012, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444226904577561141756660360
(describing in detail the opening statements of one such trial and noting the crowd that gathered
in the courthouse).
132. See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 1 (2009); James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Patent Litigation
Explosion, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 401, 401 (2013). While garnering significant attention, scholars
argue that our patent system has faced similar challenges in the past. See, e.g., Colleen V.
Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325, 344–46 (2012) (chronicling the
agrarian and railroad patent crises).
133. See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013); Patent Transparency and
Improvements Act, S. 1720, 113th Cong. (2013); Patent Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013, 113th
Cong. (2013); Patent Litigation Integrity Act, S. 1612, 113th Cong. (2013).
134. See infra Part III.D (discussing the local patent rules trend).
135. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
AGE 127 (6th ed. 2012) (“The history of the U.S. patent system in the twentieth century reflects
swings between greater and lesser protection.”).
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nineteenth century witnessed a spate of innovative activity with patents
granted for key inventions like the light bulb, telephone system, and
airplane.136 Beginning in the 1920s, however, this trend of robust patent
protection began to reverse as large companies unfairly exploited their
patent portfolios.137 Two decades later, World War II heralded a new era of
protectionism as technologies were developed and patented as a corollary of
the war effort.138
But, once again, the pendulum swung back and a “low-water mark” for
patent protection was reached in the 1960s and 1970s.139 With the passage
of the 1952 Patent Act,140 inventors were filing more patent applications and
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) was issuing more
patents. Yet federal courts were more willing than ever to invalidate those
patents; indeed, an estimated sixty percent of litigated patents were
adjudged invalid or unenforceable during the 1970s.141 Further complicating
patent litigation during this time were the numerous circuit splits on
substantive matters of patent law.142 Fractured patent doctrine not only
created confusion and a sense of unfairness, it allegedly led to rampant
forum shopping as well.143 Anecdotes suggest that patent owners would
136. Id.
137. Id.; see also Steven P. Reynolds, Antitrust and Patent Licensing: Cycles of
Enforcement and Current Policy, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 129, 133–34 (1997) (“The 1920s saw the
development of large, often international, patent pooling arrangements. Companies entered
cross-licensing arrangements with their competitors, limiting entry to those that participated in
the arrangement.”).
138. MERGES ET AL., supra note 135, at 127 (“By the time the war was over, there was a
consensus in Congress in favor of a strong patent system.”).
139. Id.
140. U.S. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-592, 66 Stat. 781 (codified as amended in 35
U.S.C.).
141. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 206 (1998) (reporting that in the 1970s, only about thirty-five
percent of litigated patents were held valid, while in the 1990s, the figure increased to about
fifty-six percent); see also Steven Z. Szczepanski, Licensing or Settlement: Deferring the Fight
to Another Day, 15 AIPLA Q.J. 298, 301 (1987) (“The statistics on adjudication of invalidity by
Federal Courts of Appeals for the time period from 1953 to 1977 reveals that about sixty
percent of the adjudicated patents were held invalid.”).
142. See David O. Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law Adjudication:
Rules and Standards, 46 CONN. L. REV. 415, 468 (2013).
143. See COMM’N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., COMM’N ON REVISION
OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS. STRUCTURE & INTERNAL PROCEDURES:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1975), reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 220 (“[D]isparity in
results in different circuits leads to widespread forum shopping . . . ‘[which] demeans the entire
judicial process and the patent system as well.’”). Some commentators have questioned whether
forum shopping was really that widespread. See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the
Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 75 n.116 (2010) (collecting works challenging the
rampant forum shopping claim).
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“scramble to get into the 5th, 6th and 7th circuits since the courts there
[were] not inhospitable to patents whereas infringers scramble[d] to get
anywhere but in these circuits.”144 This combination of factors persuaded
Congress that the time had come to overhaul our patent system.
Congress passed legislation in 1982 to create the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, an Article III court that would have
jurisdiction over virtually all patent appeals.145 The Federal Circuit was
created to bring national uniformity to patent law and to reduce forum
shopping in patent litigation.146 Congress hoped that a “single court of
appeals for patent cases [would] promote certainty”147—an expectation most
commentators believe the Federal Circuit has fulfilled.148 Indeed, some
suggest the Federal Circuit has surpassed Congress’s vision for it, becoming
patent law’s most powerful institution.149
B.

The Federal Circuit and Procedure

From the start of the Federal Circuit experiment, it was clear that
Congress intended for Federal Circuit law to govern substantive issues of

144. COMM’N ON REVISION, supra note 143, at 370.
145. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 101, 96 Stat. 25.
Initially, the Federal Circuit did not have jurisdiction over counterclaims arising under the
patent laws based on the well-pleaded complaint rule, see Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air
Circulations Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831–32 (2002), but Congress closed that gap when it
passed the America Invents Act. See Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent
Law: Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 2001 n.183 (2013).
146. H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20 (1981) (“Patent litigation long has been identified as a
problem area, characterized by undue forum-shopping and unsettling inconsistency in
adjudications.”); S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981) (“The creation of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit will produce desirable uniformity in this area of the law. Such uniformity will
reduce the forum-shopping that is common to patent litigation.”).
147. H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20–22.
148. See, e.g., Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547,
1552 (2011) (“[T]he Federal Circuit is valued for having brought uniformity to a fractured area
of law.”); Nard, supra note 143, at 75 (“In the first decade of its existence, the court earned
praise for achieving a desirable degree of uniformity, replacing otherwise disjointed and
conflicting regional circuit precedents.”)
149. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 7 (2003) (stating that the creation of the Federal Circuit is
“perhaps the single most significant institutional innovation in the field of intellectual property
in the last quarter-century”); Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1747, 1757 (2011) (“[T]he Federal Circuit has become the most important expositor of the
substantive law of patents in the United States.”); Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a
Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1795 (2013) (arguing that the Federal Circuit
has consolidated its power to shape patent law).
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patent law like infringement and obviousness.150 What Congress apparently
failed to consider was whether procedural questions in patent cases should
be controlled by Federal Circuit or regional circuit law.151 Just two years
after its creation, however, the Federal Circuit had to resolve this choice-oflaw question in Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Manufacturing Co.152
Panduit and its progeny hold that regional circuit law generally applies
unless the procedural question is “unique to patent issues”153 or “intimately
involved with the substance of patent laws,”154 in which case Federal Circuit
law governs.155
Scholars have criticized the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law doctrine and
proposed various solutions. Then-professor Kimberly Moore (now a Federal
Circuit judge) and Ted Field have both suggested a bright-line rule whereby
all procedural issues in patent cases would be governed by Federal Circuit
law.156 Joan Schaffner, by contrast, would maintain the bifurcated choice-oflaw framework, but proposes new criteria that would result in regional
circuit law applying more often.157 Without wading into the debate over
which solution is better, suffice it to say that the Federal Circuit’s current
choice-of-law approach can be confusing, unpredictable, and difficult to
apply.158 The results of this test are often bizarre: Federal Circuit law
governs procedural issues with no apparent relationship to patent law (e.g.,
personal jurisdiction),159 while regional circuit law controls issues that are
closely tied to patent law (e.g., use of technical advisors).160
150. See supra Part III.A.
151. See Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
overruled on other grounds by Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 763 (1992).
152. 744 F.2d 1564, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
153. Id. at 1574–75.
154. Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
155. Over the years, the Federal Circuit has articulated its choice-of-law test inconsistently.
See Ted L. Field, Improving the Federal Circuit’s Approach to Choice of Law for Procedural
Matters in Patent Cases, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 643, 650–53 (2009). In fact, the Federal
Circuit itself has admitted that “this test has been variously and inconstantly phrased.” Biodex
Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 856 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
156. Field, supra note 155, at 692–98; Kimberly A. Moore, Juries, Patent Cases & Lack of
Transparency, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 779, 800 (2002).
157. Joan E. Schaffner, Federal Circuit “Choice of Law”: Erie Through the Looking Glass,
81 IOWA L. REV. 1173, 1173 (1996).
158. See Gugliuzza, supra note 149, at 1845–46.
159. Graphic Controls Corp. v. Utah Med. Prods., Inc., 149 F.3d 1382, 1385 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
160. TechSearch, L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1376–81 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Even
stranger, if the Federal Circuit decides the procedural issue is governed by regional circuit law
but there’s no authority on point, the Federal Circuit will “predict” how the regional circuit
would rule. See, e.g., WI-LAN, Inc. v. Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, 684 F.3d 1364,
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The result is a line of Federal Circuit cases that is often the sole authority
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This Article puts largely to the side the merits of this choice-of-law
regime, highlighting instead the impact it has on patent procedure. On the
one hand, applying Federal Circuit law to certain procedural issues may
undermine trans-substantivity by creating special rules for patent cases. 161
At the same time, when Federal Circuit law governs procedure in patent
cases, it promotes trans-territoriality because the law on, say, personal
jurisdiction will be the same in the Eastern District of Texas, the Southern
District of New York, or any other district. Although far from perfect, the
Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law doctrine does increase uniformity of patent
procedure to some degree.162 In contradistinction, local patent rules—first
introduced in the Northern District of California more than a decade ago—
frustrate patent law’s uniformity principle from both a trans-substantive and
trans-territorial perspective because they are substance-specific rules that
vary from one district to the next.
C.

The Genesis of Local Patent Rules

On December 1, 2000, the Northern District of California became the
first district court in the country to adopt local patent rules.163 The local
patent rules were an outgrowth of the Northern District’s participation in the
CJRA demonstration program, which required the court to experiment with
various case management procedures.164 As home to Silicon Valley, the
Northern District experienced an uptick in civil filings in the 1980s and
1990s, particularly in securities and patent cases.165 The chief judge
therefore appointed an advisory committee in 1994 to develop and propose
local rules that would reduce cost and delay in the district, including

on a topic, though not technically binding on lower courts. See Gugliuzza, supra note 149, at
1846.
161. See Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 607 (2005)
(“The trans-substantive framework of the Rules has been undermined from within, as special
rules have been promulgated for prisoners as well as for complex cases.”).
162. Gugliuzza, supra note 149, at 1848 (“[V]iewed as a whole, the court’s choice-of-law
doctrine still fits a pattern of expanding Federal Circuit power justified by the policy aim of
ensuring uniformity in patent law.”).
163. Ware & Davy, supra note 6, at 966.
164. See supra Part II.C (discussing the various CJRA programs).
165. See, e.g., Brian Cheffins et al., Delaware Corporate Litigation and the Fragmentation
of the Plaintiffs’ Bar, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 427, 448 (“[T]he 1980s wave of securities
litigation centered around Silicon Valley, with many suits filed in the Northern District of
California.”); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J.
449, 472 (2010) (stating that patent cases were concentrated in a few districts, including the
Northern District of California).
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substance-specific rules for securities and patent cases.166 Ultimately, the
Northern District never adopted local securities rules, most probably
because Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA), which mandated heightened pleading standards and other
procedural measures that promised to reduce the burden imposed by
securities litigation.167
The Northern District did, however, adopt local patent rules, albeit more
than six years after the advisory committee was formed.168 While the
committee favored the concept of local patent rules from the start, it took
several years to iron out the details. One reason for the delay was Markman
v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,169 which was decided by the Federal Circuit
in 1995 and affirmed by the Supreme Court a year later. Markman held that
the construction of a patent, including disputed claim terms, is a pure
question of law within the province of the court.170 The decision said
nothing, though, about the procedure trial judges should use for claim
construction. Accordingly, in developing local patent rules, the Northern
District advisory committee undertook the effort to establish claim
construction (or Markman) procedures for judges to follow.171
In addition to claim construction procedures, the advisory committee
proposed local rules for infringement and validity contentions, mandatory
disclosures, discovery, and other matters.172 Pursuant to FRCP 83, the public
was afforded notice and the opportunity to comment on the proposed
rules.173 In December 2000, a majority of the district judges in the Northern
District of California adopted the nation’s first set of local patent rules. 174
Since then, federal courts across the country have followed the Northern
District’s lead promulgating rules designed especially for patent cases.

166. Ware & Davy, supra note 6, at 976–77.
167. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
168. Ware & Davy, supra note 6, at 976.
169. 517 U.S. 370, 370 (1996).
170. Id. at 372.
171. Appendix, United States District Court for the Northern District of California: Local
Rules of Practice in Patent Cases (Draft), 5 J.L. & POL’Y 769, 769 (1997).
172. Ware & Davy, supra note 6, at 975.
173. FED. R. CIV. P. 83. But see infra Part IV.C (noting that public comments on local
patent rules are not readily available to the public).
174. N. DIST. OF CAL., PATENT LOCAL RULES (Dec. 2000) (on file with author); see also
Grace Pak, Balkanization of the Local Patent Rules and a Proposal to Balance Uniformity and
Local Experimentation, 2 INTELL. PROP. BR. 44, 44 (2011).
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The Proliferation of Local Patent Rules

Between 2000 and today, thirty district courts in twenty different states
have exercised the discretion granted by FRCP 83 and adopted
comprehensive local patent rules.175 Some of these courts like the Eastern
District of Texas and Northern District of Illinois have heavy patent
dockets, so it’s not surprising that they’ve opted for specialized patent
rules.176 For others, such as the Eastern District of Missouri and the Western
District of Tennessee, the explanation is less obvious. Perhaps some district
courts adopt local patent rules to entice patent plaintiffs to sue there since
patent litigation can prove beneficial to a local economy.177 Whatever the
reason, the bottom line is that close to a third of federal district courts today
have a set of procedural rules that apply exclusively to patent cases.
Besides these comprehensive rules, approximately twenty districts have
adopted more limited local patent rules—meaning a few isolated rules
particularized for patent cases. These rules vary considerably in substance
and scope. Some of these rules focus on early resolution of patent cases by
providing for early neutral evaluation of the case or by permitting
magistrates to act as special masters.178 Others focus on discovery, but take
different tacks. The District of Kansas, for instance, grants patent litigants

175. Jensen, supra note 5. The districts with local patent rules include: California (Northern
and Southern); Georgia (Northern); Idaho; Illinois (Northern); Indiana (Northern and Southern);
Maryland; Massachusetts; Minnesota; Missouri (Eastern); Nevada; New Hampshire; New
Jersey; New York (Eastern, Northern, Southern, and Western); North Carolina (Eastern,
Middle, and Western); Ohio (Northern and Southern); Pennsylvania (Western); Tennessee
(Western); Texas (Eastern and Southern); Utah; Washington (Eastern and Western). Id. In the
Southern District of Indiana, comprehensive local patent rules were effected pursuant to a case
management plan. See United States District Court, Southern District of Indiana, Case
Management Plans, USCOURTS (last visited Mar. 14, 2015), http://www.insd.uscourts.gov/casemanagement-plans.
176. See, e.g., JAMES C. PISTORINO, 2012 TRENDS IN PATENT CASE FILINGS AND VENUE:
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS MOST POPULAR FOR PLAINTIFFS (AGAIN) BUT 11 PERCENT FEWER
DEFENDANTS
NAMED
NATIONWIDE
3
(2013),
available
at
http://www.perkinscoie.com/files/upload/LIT_13_02Pistorino_2012Article.pdf (naming the
Eastern District of Texas and the Northern District of Illinois as top patent districts in 2012).
177. See, e.g., Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV.
631, 636–37 (2015); Julie Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
24,
2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/business/24ward.html?pagewanted=all
(discussing the positive economic effects experienced by Marshall, Texas as a result of visiting
lawyers trying cases there); Henry M. Sneath & Robert O. Lindefjeld, Fast Track Patent
Litigation: Toward More Procedural Certainty and Cost Control, 73 DEF. COUNS. J. 201, 201
(2006) (stating that the Western District of Pennsylvania adopted local patent rules to “draw,
over time, a larger share of the regional and national patent litigation claims”).
178. See, e.g., D. VT. L.R.; N.D. ALA. L.R. 72.2 (magistrate judge may be designated as
special master in patent cases).
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four extra months to complete discovery,179 while the District of Oregon has
limited electronic discovery in patent cases.180 Districts have also fashioned
special rules for patent trials, including relatively quick trial dates181 and
mandatory disclosures in pretrial statements.182 Local patent rules, therefore,
are even more ubiquitous than they appear at first blush.
Yet when it comes to the balkanization of patent procedure, local rules
are just the tip of the iceberg. Over the past decade or so, a plethora of socalled “local-local” patent rules have cropped up in district courts across the
country. Local-local rules refer to an individual judge’s special procedures
and instructions, often issued in the form of standing or scheduling
orders.183 Though difficult to quantify, anecdotal evidence indicates that
local-local patent rules are in widespread use today.184
Without attempting to catalogue all local-local patent rules, this Article
offers several examples as illustrative. The District of Delaware, a court
with one of the busiest patent dockets but no “official” local patent rules, is
a good starting point.185 There are four district judges in Delaware and each
has implemented some sort of special rules for patent cases in his or her
court. Recently, Chief Judge Stark adopted a comprehensive set of
procedures that he will follow in patent cases.186 Judge Sleet uses special
scheduling orders and preliminary jury instructions for patent cases. 187
Judge Robinson has numerous patent-specific procedures, including
scheduling orders, voir dire questions, claim construction guidelines, trial

179. D. KAN. L.R. 26.1.
180. D. OR. L.R. 26-6 (providing that the Model Order Regarding E-Discovery in Patent
Cases governs in all patent infringement actions).
181. S.D. ILL. L.R. 16.1.
182. E.D. CAL. L.R. 281(b)(6)(ii).
183. See, e.g., Nguyen, supra note 165, at 477; Brian Daley et al., Pretrial Proceedings in
Patent Infringement Actions: A Comparison Among Canada, the United Kingdom, and the
United States of America, 35 AIPLA Q.J. 113, 150 (2007).
184. Baron Servs., Inc. v. Media Weather Innovations L.L.C., 717 F.3d 907, 918 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (noting that some “individual judges have elected to impose local patent rules”).
185. See, e.g., Everett Upshaw, The Changing Landscape of Patent Litigation, TRIAL, Feb.
2014 at 44, 49 n.27; Dominick T. Gattuso, The U.S. District Court: Managing a Busy Docket,
DEL. LAW., Summer 2013, at 8–9.
186. U.S. Dist. Court, Dist. of Del., Chief Judge Leonard P. Stark, Forms, USCOURTS,
http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/judge/chief-judge-leonard-p-stark (last visited Mar. 14, 2015).
187. U.S. Dist. Court, Dist. of Del., Judge Gregory M. Sleet, Forms, USCOURTS,
http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/judge/judge-gregory-m-sleet (last visited Mar. 14, 2015).
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guidelines, and preliminary jury instructions.188 Finally, Judge Andrews has
adopted a scheduling order and voir dire questions for patent cases.189
Though there are some similarities among the Delaware judges’ locallocal rules—e.g., they all use patent-specific scheduling orders—each
judge’s scheduling order is different. For instance, Judge Sleet requires
parties to seek permission to file summary judgment motions;190 Judge
Robinson limits the type of definitions parties may propose in claim
construction ;191 and Judge Stark mandates that parties provide the court
with a tutorial on the relevant technology.192 Judges Stark and Andrews
permit motions in limine,193 but Judges Sleet and Robinson do not.194 Judges
Stark and Robinson require early disclosure of the plaintiff’s “damages
model” and defendant’s sales figures, but Judges Andrews and Sleet do
not.195 These are just a few illustrations of the differences among the four
judges’ local-local patent rules. The point is that, in the District of Delaware
where close to twenty percent of patent cases are filed,196 the procedures
governing patent litigation are highly judge-dependent.
The District of Delaware may be the paradigmatic example of the locallocal rules phenomenon, but it certainly is not alone. In the Northern
District of Texas, judges in the Dallas Division follow specialized patent
rules, even though the rest of the district does not.197 The Central District of
California, which has considered (but so far rejected) comprehensive patent
rules,198 currently has at least three judges with local-local patent rules.199

188. U.S. Dist. Court, Dist. of Del., Judge Sue L. Robinson, Forms, USCOURTS,
http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/judge/judge-sue-l-robinson (last visited Mar. 14, 2015).
189. U.S. Dist. Court, Dist. of Del., Judge Richard G. Andrews, Forms, USCOURTS
http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/judge/judge-richard-g-andrews (last visited Mar. 14, 2015).
190. U.S. Dist. Court, Dist. of Del., supra note 187, at Sleet’s Scheduling Order for Patent
Cases ¶ 8 (last revised Feb. 25, 2014).
191. Judge Sue L. Robinson, supra note 188, at Judge Robinson’s Scheduling Order for
Patent Cases ¶ 5 n.6 (last revised Feb. 5, 2015).
192. Chief Judge Leonard P. Stark, supra note 186, at Judge Stark’s Scheduling Order for
Patent Cases ¶ 11 (last revised June 2014).
193. Id. ¶ 20; Judge Richard G. Andrews, supra note 189, at Judge Andrews’ Scheduling
Order for Patent Cases ¶ 14 (last revised Apr. 2012).
194. Judge Sue L. Robinson, supra note 188, at ¶ 10; Judge Gregory M. Sleet, supra note
187, at ¶ 12.
195. Chief Judge Leonard P. Stark, supra note 186, at ¶ 7; Judge Sue L. Robinson, supra
note 188, at ¶ 1.
196. See, e.g., PISTORINO, supra note 176, at 3 (indicating that, in 2012, 17.82% of patent
cases were filed in the District of Delaware).
197. U.S. Dist. Court, N. Dist. of Tex., Dall. Div., Miscellaneous Order No. 62 (Apr. 2,
2007), available at http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/pdf/misc_orders/misc62_4-2-07.pdf.
198. See, e.g., Erin Coe, Calif. Judge Sets Sights on Patent Local Rules, LAW 360 (Mar. 23,
2011),
http://www.law360.com/articles/226768/calif-judge-sets-sights-on-patent-local-rules;
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Judge Crabb in the Western District of Wisconsin has announced that she
will only “construe [patent claim] terms as part of summary judgment
motions practice” and “will not hold a stand-alone claims construction
hearing.”200 Perhaps most surprising, though, is that these local-local rules
exist even in courts with comprehensive local patent rules. Indeed, in the
Northern District of California, about a quarter of the district judges (six of
twenty three) have particularized patent rules above and beyond what the
district has endorsed.201
Not only is patent procedure established at the district, division, or judge
level, it is sometimes decided on a case-by-case basis. It has become
relatively common practice for parties to ask courts without local patent
rules to apply the local patent rules of another district court, usually the
Northern District of California.202 Some courts engage in this practice rather
frequently,203 while others save it for the rare patent case filed in their

Gollwitzer, supra note 10, at 95 (noting that there are no local patent rules in the Central District
of California).
199. U.S. Dist. Court, Cent. Dist. of Cal., FAQs About Judges’ Procedures and Schedules,
http://court.cacd.uscourts.gov/CACD/JudgeReq.nsf/FAQs+about+Judges%27+Procedures+and
+Schedules?OpenView (indicating that Judges Fairbank, Guilford, and Wright have adopted
their own local patent rules) (last visited Mar. 14, 2015).
200. Dashwire, Inc. v. Synchronoss Techs., Inc., No. 11-cv-257-bbc, at *1 (W.D. Wis. July
29, 2011).
201. U.S.
Dist.
Court,
N.
Dist.
of
Cal.,
Judges,
USCOURTS,
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/judges (last visited Mar. 14, 2015) (indicating that Judges White,
Armstrong, Gonzalez, Hamilton, Donato, and Davila all have standing orders for patent cases).
An early draft of the Northern District of California’s local patent rules provided that “[i]n
promulgating these rules, it is the intent of the court to establish a uniform set of pre-trial
procedures that presumptively apply to proceedings before all the judges of the court and to
reduce the occasion for Standing Orders by individual judges.” U.S. District Court for the N.D.
Cal.: Local Rules of Practice in Patent Cases (Draft), 5 J.L. & POL’Y 769, 769 (1997)
(emphasis added). However, the version of the rules adopted in 2000 did not include anything
about standing orders. See N. DIST. OF CAL., PATENT LOCAL RULES, supra note 174.
202. See, e.g., Kruse Tech. P’Ship v. Volkswagen AG, 2013 WL 5526526, at *3 (Fed. Cir.
Oct. 8, 2013) (stating that the judge in the Central District of California applied the N.D. Cal.
Local Patent Rules); Health Grades, Inc. v. MDx Med., Inc., 2013 WL 149760, at *1 (D. Col.
Jan. 14, 2013) (“At the parties’ request, I adopted the Patent Local Rules for the Northern
District of California as applicable to this case.”); Nano-Second Tech. Co., Ltd. v. Dynaflex
Int’l, 2012 WL 2077253, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 6, 2012) (stating that “the parties stipulated to
follow the Patent Local Rules of the Northern District of California”); Tokai Corp. v. Easton
Enter. Inc., 2009 WL 2047845, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2009) (holding that the 2008 version of
the Northern District of California’s local patent rules apply in this case).
203. See supra note 202 (citing several cases from the Central District of California
applying the Northern District’s local patent rules); see also Coe, supra note 198 (noting that
some judges in the Central District of California apply the Northern District’s local patent
rules).
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district.204 Either way, the result is the same: the impact of local patent rules
is being felt by district courts and patent litigants throughout the country.
To be sure, the localization of patent procedure has had some positive
effects on our patent system.205 If nothing else, district courts have served as
procedural laboratories for patent cases and can provide vital data for any
sort of national reform effort.206 But, as the next Part of this Article
discusses, localization has also led to severe fragmentation of patent
procedure, which presents a host of problems for our patent litigation
system.
IV.

THE PROBLEMS WITH LOCAL PATENT RULES

The Northern District of California first adopted local patent rules in
2000, and close to one-third of district courts have followed in its
footsteps.207 Local patent rules are necessary, these courts believe, because
of “the complexities and uniqueness of issues associated with management
of patent . . . [] litigation.”208 Patent litigants and courts, including the
Federal Circuit, have embraced such rules because they “ensure just,
efficient, and economical handling of [patent] cases.”209 Even assuming this
is true,210 however, local patent rules come at a cost both to our patent
system and our system of federal civil procedure.

204. See, e.g., Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 665 F.3d 1269, 1275–76
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (stating that parties in the District of Nebraska agreed to be bound by the Patent
Local Rules of the Northern District of California); Pure Fishing, Inc. v. Normark Corp., 2012
WL 3062683, at *2 (D.S.C. July 26, 2012) (stating that parties adopted the Northern District of
California’s local patent rules by agreement).
205. See Nguyen, supra note 165, at 452 (arguing that district courts can function as
laboratories for national patent reform).
206. Id.
207. See supra note 175 (listing the district courts with comprehensive local patent rules).
208. U.S. Dist. Court, N. Dist. of N.Y., Local Rules of Procedure for Patent Cases, ¶ 1.1,
http://www.nynd.uscourts.gov/sites/nynd/files/Local_Patent_Rules_0.pdf (last visited Mar. 14,
2015).
209. Id.
210. Some recent studies suggest that local patent rules do not speed up patent litigation.
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401, 413–15 (2010)
(finding that the Western District of Wisconsin and Eastern District of Virginia, which do not
have local patent rules, resolve cases much quicker than either the Northern District of
California or the Eastern District of Texas, which do have local patent rules); Pelletier, supra
note 10, at 458 (“[T]he data indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between
the average number of years to reach claim construction between high volume jurisdictions with
and without local patent rules. . . .”).
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The Silent Revolution of Patent Procedure

Over the last fifteen-odd years, a silent revolution has transformed patent
procedure in federal court.211 Where once patent cases were subject to the
same procedures as other civil lawsuits, now they are governed by a
patchwork of local (and local-local) rules that vary by district, division,
judge, and even case.212 What started as an attempt to regularize patent
litigation, particularly in light of Markman, has turned into a complete
overhaul of patent procedure. No longer are these local rules limited to
patent-specific procedures like claim construction and infringement
contentions.213 Today, local patent rules are all-encompassing, regulating
myriad aspects of patent litigation including pleading standards,214
electronic discovery,215 and summary judgment.216
On the whole, local patent rules have been warmly received by judges,
litigants, and commentators alike. Advocates praise the rules for bringing
greater consistency and predictability to patent litigation.217 Another
perceived benefit is that local patent rules can be tailored to the unique
needs of a particular community and patent bar.218 To some surprise, even
the Federal Circuit has demonstrated support for local patent rules. Not only
did former Chief Judge Rader explicitly endorse local patent rules,219 the
Federal Circuit has been extremely deferential to district courts on matters
relating to such rules.220
211. Cf. HERBERT JACOB,
THE UNITED STATES (1988).

SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN

212. See supra Part III.D (discussing the proliferation of local patent rules in courts
throughout the country).
213. See, e.g., N. DIST. OF CAL., PATENT LOCAL RULES, supra note 174.
214. See U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF N.H., SUPPLEMENTAL PATENT RULES 2.1.
215. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE D. OR., L.R. 26-6; U.S. Dist. Court for the E.D.
Tex., Local Rules, App. P, Order Regarding E-Discovery in Patent Cases (Feb. 28, 2012).
216. Judge Gregory M. Sleet, supra note 190, at ¶ 12.
217. See, e.g., IXYS Corp. v. Advanced Power Tech., Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (N.D. Cal.
June 16, 2004); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Patent Prudential Standing, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 17,
23 (2013); Jesse Greenspan, Ill. District Court Pushes Local Patent Rules, LAW 360 (Mar. 27,
2009), http://www.law360.com/articles/94205/ill-district-court-pushes-local-patent-rules; Coe,
supra note 198, at 1.
218. Coe, supra note 198, at 1.
219. Chief Judge Randall R. Rader, The State of Patent Litigation, E.D. TEX. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE
7
(Sept.
27,
2011),
http://patentlyo.com/media/docs/2011/09/raderstateofpatentlit.pdf (“[O]ur courts need to
understand that these complex and demanding patent cases profit from an announced and
dependable set of procedural rules that all parties understand in advance.”).
220. Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 289 F.3d 761, 774 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also
Safeclick, L.L.C. v. Visa Intern. Serv. Ass’n, 2006 WL 3017347, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 23, 2006)
(stating that standard of review for local patent rules is “very deferential”); Jeanne C. Fromer,
Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1482–83 (2010) (arguing that the Federal Circuit’s
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At the same time, proponents downplay the scope and reach of local
patent rules. The Federal Circuit, for example, has characterized local patent
rules as non-substantive and “essentially a series of case management
orders.”221 More pointedly, Professor Xuan-Thao Nguyen has argued that
“[l]ocal patent reform does not change substantive patent law, allaying fears
of violating the supremacy of national patent law.”222 Instead, she explains,
“local patent reform focuses on the development and utilization of local
procedural rules to streamline patent litigation.”223
This somewhat muted response to the transformation of patent procedure
is understandable. Patent experts tend to treat local patent rules as tangential
because they don’t strike at the heart of patent law as rules on patentable
subject matter, obviousness, and infringement would.224 Proceduralists, on
the other hand, largely ignore local patent rules because they are highly
specialized and apply to a narrow swath of federal suits. 225 Maybe this
approach was appropriate when local patent rules were confined to a few
high degree of deference for local patent rules suggests the court supports such rules). Notably,
in a recent decision, the Federal Circuit held that a district court abused its discretion by
imposing a fee-shifting sanction for failing to comply with the court’s local patent rules. See
Anticancer, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 769 F.3d 1323, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2014). At first blush,
Anticancer appears to buck the trend of deference by the Federal Circuit on local patent rules
issues. However, a closer read reflects that Anticancer is distinguishable on its facts. Generally,
the Federal Circuit applies its own law when reviewing local patent rules because they “are
unique to patent cases and have a close relationship to enforcement of substantive patent law.”
O2 Micro Intern. Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see
also supra Part III.B (discussing the Federal Circuit’s choice of law doctrine). In Anticancer, by
contrast, the Federal Cicuit applied Ninth Circuit law because the question on appeal was “not
whether the district court properly required additional specificity in the[] [preliminary
infringement] contentions, but whether a fee-shifting sanction was appropriately attached to the
court’s authorization to supplement the Contentions.” 769 F.3d at 1336. In other words, the
Federal Circuit concluded that—based on well-established Ninth Circuit law—the district court
had abused its discretion by imposing a fee-shifting sanction, not by requiring the parties to
comply with its local patent rules.
221. O2 Micro, 467 F.3d at 1363.
222. Nguyen, supra note 165, at 452.
223. Id.
224. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 453 F.3d 1346, 1347–48 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (Rader, J., dissenting) (“The role of the claims in an infringement or anticipation
analysis is at the heart of patent law.”); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law
and the Limits of Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1151 (2008) (“The question of
permissible claim scope lies at the heart of patent law.”); Jason Rantanen, The Federal Circuit’s
New Obviousness Jurisprudence: An Empirical Study, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709, 712–13
(2013) (stating that obviousness is at the heart of patent law).
225. See Chad M. Oldfather, Judging, Expertise, and the Rule of Law, 89 WASH. U. L. REV.
847, 858 (2012) (“[B]ecause the areas of law most likely to be given over to specialized courts
will be technical in nature, the public and the bulk of the bar are unlikely to monitor these
courts’ output closely.”).
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districts or judges. But the localization movement is now widespread and
likely to continue to grow—a situation that threatens our patent and
procedural systems alike.
B.

Local Patent Rules and Uniformity of Patent Law

Uniformity is a guiding principle in many areas of the law, but perhaps
none more so than patent law. In point of fact, the Federal Circuit was
created specifically for the purpose of bringing uniformity to patent doctrine
and policy.226 Congress believed that greater uniformity would increase
predictability for patent litigants, reduce forum shopping among the
regional circuits, and ultimately strengthen our patent system. 227 And a
strong patent system, so the theory went, was crucial to our nation’s
technological leadership and economic prosperity.228
The past thirty years of Federal Circuit case law is replete with examples
of the court acknowledging and attempting to comply with its uniformity
mandate.229 With respect to local patent rules, however, the Federal Circuit
has remained uncharacteristically quiet about their effect on uniformity.
Instead, on the few occasions when the Federal Circuit has reviewed local
patent rules, it has been extremely deferential to district courts.230 It is
difficult to know why the Federal Circuit has taken this approach to local
patent rules. Maybe the Federal Circuit simply appreciates the effort to
226. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see also S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981) (“The
creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will produce desirable uniformity in this
area of the law. Such uniformity will reduce the forum-shopping that is common to patent
litigation.”).
227. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982; H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20 (1981)
(“Patent litigation long has been identified as a problem area, characterized by undue forumshopping and unsettling inconsistency in adjudications.”).
228. See, e.g., Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit in Perspective, 54 AM. U. L. REV.
821, 822 (2005); Lee Petherbridge, Patent Law Uniformity?, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 421, 422
(2009).
229. See, e.g., Lighting Ballast Control L.L.C. v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d
1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (treating claim construction as a matter of law will promote uniformity)
vacated, 135 S.Ct. 1173 (2015); Highway Equip. Co., Inc. v. FECO, Ltd., 469 F.3d 1027, 1032
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that Federal Circuit law applies to questions regarding 35 U.S.C. §
285 “to promote national uniformity concerning the availability of attorney’s fees” in patent
cases); Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, 394 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (acknowledging
the “mandate to promote national uniformity in patent practice”); Panduit Corp. v. All States
Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The fundamental underpinning for
uniformity was Congress’ abhorrence of conflicts and confusion in the judicial system.”).
230. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the deference afforded by the Federal Circuit to local
patent rules).

96

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

manage and streamline patent litigation,231 or perhaps the Federal Circuit
hopes to foster better relations with district courts.232 Either way, the Federal
Circuit thus far appears indifferent to the balkanization created by local
patent rules.
Yet the fact remains that local patent rules—including comprehensive
local patent rules, local-local patent rules, and case-specific local patent
rules—undermine uniformity in patent law.233 Looking first at
comprehensive local patent rules, by which I mean official local patent rules
adopted by a district court, there are several ways they promote
disuniformity. First and foremost, approximately two-thirds of district
courts have not adopted local patent rules. While the number of courts with
local patent rules has grown rapidly in a relatively short time span, the
majority of courts still have no such rules on the books.234 Second, several
districts with busy patent dockets have declined to adopt local patent rules,
including the Central District of California, the District of Delaware, the
Southern District of Florida, and the Eastern District of Virginia. So even in
“hot spots” for patent litigation, there’s no consistency regarding the
existence of local patent rules.
Nor are all comprehensive local patent rules created equal, and so
differences abound even among courts that have implemented local patent
rules.235 It is true that most courts modeled their patent rules on the Northern
District of California’s to a degree, and thus share some commonalities. For
instance, infringement contentions, invalidity contentions, and claim
construction are features of all thirty districts’ local patent rules.236 But those
matters are disparately handled by each district. To illustrate this point, let’s
231. See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 289 F.3d 761, 774 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[T]his
court defers to the district court when interpreting and enforcing local rules so as not to frustrate
local attempts to manage patent cases according to prescribed guidelines.”).
232. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, District Courts as Patent Laboratories, 1 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 307, 319–22 (2011) (suggesting different ways to create a “beneficial symbiosis” between
the Federal Circuit and district courts); Gugliuzza, supra note 149, at 1796 (arguing that the
Federal Circuit has obstructed district courts from shaping patent law).
233. See supra Part III.D (discussing the different types of local patent rules currently in
place in district courts).
234. Jensen, supra note 5.
235. See, e.g., Gollwitzer, supra note 10, at 96 (“[L]ocal patent rules that have been
adopted around the country are not consistent with each other.”); Pak, supra note 174, at 44
(“The local patent rules vary considerably from one forum to the next.”); Pelletier, supra note
10, at 464 (“local procedures vary widely among the at least twenty-four district courts currently
having formally adopted patent rules”); Ware & Davy, supra note 6, at 965 (“[T]here are
significant variations among the procedures in the districts resulting in a less-than-ideal
situation.”).
236. Travis
Jensen,
Summary
Charts,
LOCAL
PATENT
RULES,
http://www.localpatentrules.com/summary-charts/ (last updated Nov. 2014).
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consider the timing for infringement contentions. In a handful of districts,
the patent owner is required to make its infringement contentions within
fourteen days of the initial case management conference.237 Other districts
grant a little more time, requiring that infringement contentions be made 15,
30, or 45 days after the case management conference.238 Still others use a
different time measurement altogether, such as 150 days after filing the
complaint, 28 days after filing an answer, or 10 days before the case
management conference.239 The timing regarding invalidity contentions and
claim construction is similarly disjointed.240
Beyond timing, local patent rules diverge on many other issues. Take, for
example, limitations on claim terms. Some districts limit parties to ten terms
for claim construction, while others permit only the “most significant”
terms to be construed.241 Other districts simply require the parties to meet
and confer, and then judges make decisions about limiting claim terms on a
case-by-case basis.242 There are also more substantive differences regarding
infringement and invalidity contentions. Some rules provide that patent
owners must disclose their theories of infringement (e.g., literal, doctrine of
equivalents, willful) and that alleged infringers must disclose all possible
defenses (e.g., lack of patentable subject matter, inequitable conduct, best
mode), while others have no such requirements. In a similar vein, some
districts allow both preliminary and final contentions, but others give parties
only one bite at the apple granting leave to amend sparingly.243
These few examples represent the variation among comprehensive local
patent rules. The purpose of this Article is not to provide a detailed
comparison of all the districts’ rules, especially since others have
undertaken that effort.244 My goal instead is to show that comprehensive
local patent rules are contributing to the disuniformity of patent procedure.
They are not alone, of course, as local-local patent rules and case-specific
patent rules have played a part in this fragmentation as well.245

237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See supra Part IV.B (comparing the Northern District of California’s rules regarding
contentions with the Eastern District of Texas’s rules).
244. Id.; see also supra note 235 (citing several articles that compare and contrast these
rules in detail).
245. See supra Part III.D (explaining that some individual judges have adopted their own
patent rules and that courts sometimes agree to apply special procedural rules in certain patent
cases).
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Accepting that local patent rules undermine patent law’s uniformity
principle, does it even matter? In recent years, jurists and scholars have
called into question the value of uniformity in patent law. 246 Most notably,
Chief Judge Diane Wood of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit delivered a speech in 2013 advocating for an end to the Federal
Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases.247 Judge Wood argued that
patent law suffers from a lack of percolation, and proposed that parties
should have a choice to file patent appeals either in the Federal Circuit or
the appropriate regional circuit.248 Although Judge Wood’s speech garnered
a lot of attention, others—including former Chief Judge Rader—have
expressed similar sentiments. Back in 2001, Judge Rader commented that
the specialized nature of the Federal Circuit has
retarded the pace of common law development in some important
ways. When the Federal Circuit speaks, that becomes the nationwide rule and in many cases, once it is spoken there is less
percolation, less chance for experimentation, less chance for . . .
the “laboratory of federalism”—various district courts and circuits,
each resolving similar issues in the same way and providing the
Supreme Court with a prism through which to view the law and
choose the best solutions for the future.249

The debate over the costs and benefits of uniformity in patent law is sure to
continue as our patent system evolves with time. For now, though,
uniformity remains the norm and is still the primary goal for patent law.250
But what about the fact that local patent rules have been characterized as
procedural? Does that mean they pose less of a danger for patent law
uniformity? The short answer is no. As Erie v. Tompkins teaches, “the line

246. See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity
Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1664 (2007); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent
Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65 (2015); David Haas et al., An Interview with Seventh
Circuit
Judge
Richard
Posner:
Part
I,
LAW 360
(Nov.
13,
2013),
http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/485352/an-interview-with-7th-circ-judge-richard-posnerpart-1 (quoting Judge Posner as saying that he does not “think the Federal Circuit has been a
success”).
247. Hon. Diane P. Wood, Keynote Address: Is it Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit’s
Exclusive Jurisdiction in Patent Cases? IPO.ORG (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.ipo.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/Wood-Keynote-Address.pdf.
248. Id. at 9–10.
249. Randall R. Rader, The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: The
Promise and Perils of a Court of Limited Jurisdiction, 5 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 4
(2001).
250. See, e.g., Gunn v. Minton, 133 S.Ct. 1059, 1067 (2013) (acknowledging the policy of
developing “a uniform body of patent law”).
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between procedural and substantive law is hazy.”251 Just because lawyers
and courts think of local patent rules as procedural does not mean they are
in fact procedural.252 Continuing the Erie analogy, what matters is whether
local patent rules are outcome determinative or encourage forum
shopping.253
Local patent rules govern infringement, validity, and claim
construction—matters at the heart of patent law.254 Even the Federal Circuit
has recognized this close relationship between local patent rules and
substantive patent doctrines when it decided that Federal Circuit law, as
opposed to regional circuit law, should apply to local patent rules. 255 For
example, a key objective of local patent rules is to require parties to
crystallize their infringement and invalidity theories early in the case, and
then adhere to those theories once they have been disclosed.256 Failure to
comply with these requirements can be outcome determinative, as was the
case in Genentech v. Amgen.257 There, the Federal Circuit affirmed
summary judgment of non-infringement, holding that the district court did
not abuse its discretion by precluding Genentech from relying on the
doctrine of equivalents since that theory was not disclosed in its
infringement contentions.258 Simply put, Genentech lost its patent
infringement claim by failing to comply with the local patent rules.
Other local rules govern substantive patent law in a more blatant way.
Judge Robinson in the District of Delaware, for instance, precludes parties
from proposing “plain and ordinary meaning” as the definition for disputed
claim terms because that “effectively leaves claim construction in the hands
of the experts rather than the court.”259 In adopting this tenet of claim
251. 304 U.S. 64, 92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring).
252. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 420–21
(2010) (“Rules which lawyers call procedural do not always exhaust their effect by regulating
procedure, and in some situations, procedure and substance are so interwoven that rational
separation becomes well-nigh impossible.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
253. Id.
254. See Nguyen, supra note 165, at 452 (naming matters “at the heart of patent law”).
255. O2 Micro Intern. Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 1364–65 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (“Since the Northern District of California’s local patent rules on amendment of
infringement contentions are unique to patent cases and have a close relationship to enforcement
of substantive patent law, we proceed to review their validity and interpretation under Federal
Circuit law.”).
256. See Kilopass Tech. Inc. v. Sidense Corp., No. C 10-02066 SI, 2011 WL 5212259
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2011).
257. 289 F.3d 761, 774 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
258. Id. at 773–74. Similarly, in O2 Micro, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision refusing to allow O2 to amend its infringement contentions and granting summary
judgment of non-infringement for defendant. 467 F.3d at 1355.
259. See Judge Robinson’s Scheduling Order, supra note 191.
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construction, not only does Judge Robinson stand apart from her colleagues
on the district court,260 but her local rules may conflict with Federal Circuit
precedent as well.261 Such a disuniform application of procedural rules can
lead to arbitrary and unfair results.
In addition to being potentially outcome determinative, local patent rules
encourage forum shopping too. It has been said that forum shopping is
“alive and well” in patent litigation today.262 Many factors influence forum
shopping for plaintiffs, including high win rates, low transfer rates, and time
to trial.263 But there is also a link between forum selection and local patent
rules.264 Plaintiffs (or defendants on transfer motions) might choose or reject
a district court because of its local patent rules. By way of example,
plaintiffs may favor the Eastern District of Texas because its rules require
early disclosure of infringement and invalidity contentions together with
documents supporting those contentions.265 Knowing this, patent owners
prepare infringement contentions before filing, leaving defendants with
little time to discover and disclose invalidating prior art.266 This can put
defendants between a rock and a hard place: conduct extensive discovery
quickly and expensively or settle the case.267 Judge Davis of the Eastern
District of Texas has described this potential effect of local patent rules:
260. Hon. Leonard P. Stark, Dist. of Del., Revised Procedures for Managing Patent Cases 8
(June 18, 2014) (explaining that he is not adopting Judge Robinson’s claim construction tenet).
261. See, e.g., Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(affirming the district court’s construction of a disputed claim term as having its plain and
ordinary meaning).
262. Lemley, supra note 210, at 401; see also Chester S. Chuang, Offensive Venue: The
Curious Use of Declaratory Judgment to Forum Shop in Patent Litigation, 80 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1065, 1074–77 (2012) (discussing accused infringers’ attempts to forum shop in patent
cases); Fromer, supra note 220, at 1462–68 (discussing widespread forum shopping in patent
litigation).
263. Lemley, supra note 210, at 402–03; Ron Vogel, The Patent Pilot Program:
Reassignment Rates and the Effect of Local Patent Rules, NY INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N
BULLETIN,
Oct./Nov.
2013,
at
2,
available
at
http://www.fr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Vogel.NYIPLABulletin.Pilot-Patent-ProgramReassignment-Rates-and-Effects-of-Local-Rules.OctNov2013.pdf.
264. See, e.g., Adam S. Baldridge, Venue Considerations for Patent Infringement Cases,
ASPATORE, 2013 WL 574397, *1 (Jan. 2013) (“[W]hether a district court has adopted local
patent rules is a significant consideration for a patent holder in determining the best venue in
which to file a patent infringement action.”).
265. RULES OF PRACTICE FOR PATENT CASES BEFORE THE E. DIST. OF TEX. P.R. 3.
266. Id. at P.R. 3-3, 3-4 (requiring defendants to disclose invalidity contentions and
supporting prior art within 45 days of plaintiff’s infringement contentions).
267. See David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent
Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 335, 383 n.230 (2012) (explaining that the “costs of defense [are]
being driven by the quick discovery deadlines of the local rules”); Laura Caldera Taylor,
Overview of Key Patent Legislation and Court Decisions that Impact Patent Litigation,
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While the Court will not comment on Plaintiff’s strategy, when
combined with the requirements of the Patent Rules and the
Court’s standard docket control order, Plaintiff’s strategy presents
Defendants with a Hobson’s choice: spend more than the
settlement range on discovery, or settle for what amounts to cost
of defense, regardless of whether a Defendant believes it has a
legitimate defense.268

Thus, plaintiffs looking for quick settlements may be enticed to file their
patent suits in districts that allow significant discovery early in the case.
The Northern District of California’s local patent rules, on the other
hand, have been labeled “defendant friendly,” which may explain why
defendants in patent cases often seek transfer to that court.269 As noted
above, a common goal of local patent rules is to require parties to crystallize
their case theories early to prevent a “shifting sands” approach to claim
construction.270 While all comprehensive local patent rules include these
types of provisions, the Northern District of California has earned a
reputation for strictly enforcing the requirements regarding infringement
contentions.271 Specifically, the court has held that a “plaintiff must compare
an accused product to its patents on a claim-by-claim, element-by-element
basis for at least one of each of (the) defendant’s products. To make such a
comparison, a plaintiff must put forth information so specific that either
reverse engineering or its equivalent is required.”272 The Northern District
of California has further explained that plaintiffs may not assume claim
elements are embodied in the allegedly infringing product,273 nor is it
ASPATORE, 2011 WL 6742514, *5 (Dec. 2011) (explaining that local patent rules may force
earlier settlements).
268. Parallel Networks L.L.C. v. AEO, Inc., No. 6:10-cv-00111-LED, at 6–7 (E.D. Tex.
Mar. 15, 2011) (internal quotations omitted) (order denying motion to bifurcate).
269. Gollwitzer, supra note 10, at 97.
270. See, e.g., Trans Video Elecs. Ltd. v. Sony Elecs., No. C-093304 EMC, 2011 WL
5604063, *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2011) (“The Court finds Trans Video’s tactical shifting of
positions troubling and contrary to this Court’s effort to eliminate, via its Patent Local Rules,
‘shifting sands’ litigation tactics.”).
271. The judges in the Eastern District of Texas, by contrast, are more flexible with respect
to infringement contentions often allowing plaintiffs to conduct discovery so they can
adequately examine the accused products before finalizing their contentions. See Joseph E.
Cwik, Local Patent Rules and Their Impact on Patent Litigation, ASPATORE, 2012 WL 1670113
*5 (June 2012) (“The Eastern District of Texas Court appears more plaintiff ‘friendly,’ holding
that proper infringement contentions only provide a defendant with notice of a plaintiff’s
infringement theories.”); Gollwitzer, supra note 10, at 96 (“[I]n the Eastern District of Texas,
the judges have been more lenient when judging the sufficiency of the parties’ contentions.”).
272. Renesas v. Nanya Tech. Corp., No. C03-05709JFHRL, 2004 WL 2600466, *2 (N.D.
Cal. 2004).
273. Bender v. Advanced Micro Devices, No. C-09-1149 MMC(EMC), 2010 WL 363341
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2010).
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sufficient to allude to the fact that any electrical engineer would understand
the infringement contentions.274 If plaintiffs cannot comply with these local
patent rules—for example because they haven’t been allowed to examine
the accused products—their infringement theories will be limited and they
may end up losing the case.275
Alternatively, patent litigants may forum shop to avoid local patent rules.
The Southern District of Florida has become a popular patent venue
recently, and some believe this is partially due to the lack of local patent
rules.276 Other district courts without comprehensive local patent rules are
also patent litigation “hotspots,” including the District of Delaware, the
Eastern District of Virginia, and the Western District of Wisconsin.277 Keep
in mind, however, that these districts have general local rules, or judges
with local-local rules, that may attract patent cases. The Southern District of
Florida, Eastern District of Virginia, and Western District of Wisconsin are
all “rocket dockets,” meaning their local (or local-local) rules include
provisions ensuring a relatively short time to trial.278 And even though there
are no official local patent rules in Delaware, all four judges have locallocal patent rules.279 Some of those local-local rules, such as Judge Sleet’s
rule requiring parties to seek permission before moving for summary
judgment, are sure to appeal to forum-shopping patent plaintiffs.280
274. Bender v. Maxim Integrated Prods. Inc., No. C 09-01152 SI, 2010 WL 2991257, *2
(N.D. Cal. July 29, 2010).
275. Cwik, supra note 271, at 3 (contending that local patent rules can affect outcomes);
Gollwitzer, supra note 10, at 96 (noting “case-dispositive differences” caused by local rules).
276. Jeremy Elman, Why Florida Has Become a Hot Spot for Patent Litigation, LAW 360
(Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/460438/why-fla-has-become-a-hot-spot-forpatent-litigation (explaining that patent plaintiffs are likely flocking to the S.D. Fla. for several
reasons, including lack of local patent rules).
277. Gattuso, supra note 185, at 8; Gollwitzer, supra note 10, at 95.
278. See U.S. DIST. COURT, S.D. FLA., LOCAL RULES L.R. 7.6 (stating that trial
continuances will be granted only for “exceptional circumstances”); id. L.R. 16.1(a) (explaining
that discovery will be completed at most 365 days after the scheduling order); U.S. DIST. COURT
E.D. VA., LOCAL RULES L.R. 7(G) (“Motions for continuances of a trial . . . shall not be granted
by the mere agreement of counsel. No continuance will be granted other than for good cause
and upon such terms as the Court may impose.”); Allen A. Arnsten & Jeffrey A. Simmons, The
Tundra Docket: Western District of Wisconsin, LAW 360 (Mar. 12, 2008),
http://www.law360.com/articles/49923/the-tundra-docket-western-district-of-wisconsin
(explaining that judges in the Western District of Wisconsin typically issues case management
orders within 60 days of filing and set firm trial dates that are rarely changed).
279. See supra Part III.D (discussing the Delaware judges’ local-local patent rules).
280. See id.; see also Lemley, supra note 210, at 403 (arguing that “a jurisdiction that
grants many summary judgment motions is likely to be a defense jurisdiction, while a court that
allows many matters to go to trial is likely to end up favoring the patentee,” and then finding
that more cases go to trial in the District of Delaware (11.8%) than any of the other 32 districts
included in the study, including the Eastern District of Texas).
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In short, the question of which procedural rules will apply in patent
litigation depends on the district, division, judge, or even case. No doubt the
goals of local patent rules—streamlining, efficiency, and cost saving—are
laudable, but courts have gone about implementing those goals in very
different ways. Consequently, these highly splintered local patent rules,
which are interwoven with substantive patent law doctrine, tend to
encourage forum shopping, make patent litigation extremely unpredictable,
and impede the development of a uniform body of patent law.
C.

Local Patent Rules and Uniformity of Procedural Law

The drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sought to achieve
uniformity and cohesiveness in a single set of procedural rules for civil
lawsuits. They hoped specifically for two types of uniformity to be borne
out by the FRCP: trans-territorial uniformity and trans-substantive
uniformity.281 Trans-territoriality encompassed both interdistrict uniformity
and intrastate uniformity.282 The idea was that all federal district courts
would follow the FRCP creating interdistrict uniformity, and that state
courts would then model their procedural rules after the FRCP leading to
intrastate uniformity.283 In the context of patent litigation, trans-territoriality
refers only to interdistrict uniformity since patent cases are subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.284
Local patent rules contravene both of these uniformity principles.
Starting with trans-territoriality, the discussion above establishes that local
patent rules—like all local rules—transgress this objective of the FRCP.285
Patent procedure varies widely from one district court to the next. In some
districts, patent cases are governed by the same procedures as any other
civil suit. In others, patent procedures have been created from whole cloth
with an entirely separate set rules applying to patent cases. And then there
are districts that fall somewhere in between, with a few local rules applying
to patent cases or individual judges affording patent cases special treatment.

281. See Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 45, at 2002–06.
282. Id.
283. Carl Tobias, A Civil Discovery Dilemma for the Arizona Supreme Court, 34 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 615, 615 (2002) (“The drafters of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure hoped to
establish those rules as a model that the states could adopt, thus fostering national and intrastate
procedural uniformity.”).
284. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012).
285. See supra Part IV.B (addressing the proliferation of local patent rules).
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This patchwork approach to procedure is exactly what the drafters of the
FRCP eschewed more than seventy-five years ago.286 A uniform set of
procedural rules was supposed to make law practice simpler for lawyers and
clients. No longer would clients have to retain multiple lawyers for
nationwide litigation. But local patent rules have undermined these
objectives and created a procedural terrain that can be quite difficult to
navigate. Indeed, even in this age of email, videoconferences, and electronic
filing, parties find it necessary to hire local counsel who understand and are
familiar with the district court’s or district judge’s patent-specific rules and
procedures—precisely the situation the framers of the FRCP aimed to
avoid. 287
Local patent rules also offend the trans-substantive nature of the FRCP.
The FRCP were marked by trans-substantivity at the time of adoption, and
continue to apply trans-substantively today. There is some question whether
trans-substantivity is simply a guiding principle for the FRCP or a
requirement imposed by the Rules Enabling Act.288 In any event, the FRCP
contain very few substance-specific rules. By one count, there are only six
subsections of the eighty-six FRCP that are substance specific.289 Indeed,
although the advisory committee for the FRCP has considered a litany of
substance-specific rule changes over the past two decades, it has
recommended only one—a service rule in civil rights actions—for
adoption.290 In rejecting the others, the advisory committee has emphasized
the need to preserve a trans-substantive set of procedural rules.291
For the most part, this trans-substantive premise is reflected in district
courts’ local rulemaking as well.292 While some district courts have
286. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 44, at 371 (“The procedural system in the federal courts
before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938 tended toward staggering complexity.”).
287. See,
e.g.,
Sophisticated
Local
Counsel,
SUNSTEINLAW,
http://sunsteinlaw.com/practices/patent-ip-litigation/sophisticated-local-counsel/ (last visited
Mar. 15, 2015) (advertising the firm’s familiarity with local patent rules).
288. Compare Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009
WIS. L. REV. 535, 541 [hereinafter Burbank, Pleading] (“[T]he Rules Enabling Act’s reference
to ‘general rules’ forecloses the promulgation of different prospective rules for cases that
involve different bodies of substantive law.”), with Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive
Rights” in the Rules Enabling Act More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 48 (1998)
(“Commentators on the rulemaking process are fond of pointing out that the Court has never
found a Rule invalid for impermissibly affecting a substantive right . . . .”).
289. See Marcus, supra note 44, at 413. Those subsections include FED. R. CIV. P.
4(i)(1)(C), 4.1(b), 5.2(c), 12(a)(3), 23, 71.1. Id. at 413 n.262. I would add FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) to
that list, which sets out a heightened pleading standard for fraud-like claims.
290. See Marcus, supra note 44, at 413.
291. Id. at 414.
292. FED. R. CIV. P. 83 (providing that district courts are authorized to promulgate local
rules “not inconsistent with” the FRCP).
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promulgated substance-specific local rules, this appears to be the exception
rather than the norm.293 Perhaps district courts are simply following the
trans-substantive model of the FRCP.294 Or maybe district courts believe
substance-specific local rules would conflict with the Rules Enabling Act
and FRCP.295 What is clear is that district courts generally bypass substancespecific rules and opt for trans-substantive local rules instead.296
Curiously, though, an ample number of district courts have bucked this
trend and adopted local patent rules.297 This local patent rules movement is
noteworthy for at least three reasons. First, it seems odd that district courts
that have been wary about adopting any substance-specific local rules
would promulgate an entire set of substance-specific procedural rules for
patent cases.298 Second, local patent rules are not limited to patent-specific
procedures, such as claim construction, but govern all aspects of patent
litigation, from pleading standards to discovery to trial practice.299 Finally,
what’s most remarkable about the local patent rules movement is that,
despite being arguably the most blatant form of substance-specific
rulemaking since the FRCP were adopted, scholars have virtually ignored
the relationship between local patent rules and trans-substantivity.300
That scholars have largely overlooked local patent rules is especially
surprising when considering the momentous changes these rules have
wrought for patent litigants. Consider, for example, the difference in
pleading standards in courts with and without local patent rules. The
293. Marcus, supra note 44, at 414. Marcus surveyed ten federal districts and concluded
that only about five percent of all local rules could arguably be deemed substance-specific. Id.
For some reason, though, his survey appears not to have considered local patent rules. I say this
because the districts surveyed included the Northern District of California, the Northern District
of Illinois, the District of Massachusetts, and the Western District of Pennsylvania, all of which
had adopted local patent rules before Marcus’s article was published in 2010. Yet, in listing
these districts’ substance-specific rules, Marcus does not mention any of the local patent rules.
Id. app. tbls. 1–2 at 427–28.
294. Marcus, supra note 44, at app. tbls. 1–2 at 427–28.
295. See, e.g., Tyco Fire Prods. LP v. Victaulic Co., 777 F.Supp.2d 893, 904 n.10 (E.D. Pa.
2011) (“The notion that courts may enact rules of procedure concerning a specific subject matter
is itself debatable.”).
296. Unfortunately, as discussed later in this Part, deliberations of local rulemaking
committees are not readily available to the public, so the information about this process is
extremely limited. See Marcus, supra note 44, at 415.
297. See supra note 174 (listing the thirty district courts that have adopted local patent rules
to date).
298. See Marcus, supra note 44, at 413–14.
299. See supra Part III.D.
300. See supra note 293 (explaining that in his survey of substance-specific local rules,
Marcus excluded local patent rules). A few patent practitioners have noted that local patent rules
undermine the trans-substantive ideal of the FRCP. See Gollwitzer, supra note 10, at 94; Pak,
supra note 174, at 44; Vogel, supra note 263, at 2.
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District of New Hampshire’s local patent rules include special pleading
requirements for patent infringement claims. Specifically, the complaint (or
counterclaim) must include:
(1) a list of all products or processes (by model number,
trade name, or other specific identifying characteristic) for
which the claimant or counterclaimant has developed a
good-faith basis for alleging infringement, as of the time of
filing the pleading; and
(2) at least one illustrative asserted patent claim (per asserted
patent) for each accused product or process.301
While New Hampshire appears to be alone in explicitly modifying its
pleading standard for patent cases, every district court with local patent
rules requires early disclosure of infringement contentions.302 Those
disclosure requirements, some have argued, function as de facto heightened
pleading standards.303
Turning now to courts without local patent rules, the pleading standard
for patent infringement looks markedly different. In those courts, pleading
is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires merely
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.”304 What is more, the Federal Circuit has held that the plausibility
pleading standard established by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly305 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal306 does not apply to patent infringement
claims.307 Rather, the Federal Circuit decided, patent infringement claims
are governed by Form 18 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
301. U.S. DIST. COURT OF N.H., LOCAL RULES, SUPPLEMENTAL PATENT RULE 2.1.
302. See supra Part IV.B.
303. See Tyco Fire Prods. LP v. Victaulic Co., 777 F.Supp.2d 893, 904 (E.D. Pa. 2011)
(“[u]sing local patent rules to alter a defendant’s pleading obligations, while perhaps practical
given the very unique nature of federal patent litigation, offends the trans-substantive nature of
federal procedure”); Rebecca Love Kourlis et al., Reinvigorating Pleadings, 87 DENV. U. L.
REV. 245, 283 (2010) (analogizing the facts disclosed in infringement contentions to those that
would satisfy Twombly’s heightened pleading standard); Jonathan L. Moore, Particularizing
Patent Pleading: Pleading Patent Infringement in a Post-Twombly World, 18 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 451, 504–05 (2010) (suggesting that local patent rules could serve as an alternative to
heightened pleading requirements).
304. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
305. 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (holding that plaintiffs must plead “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face”).
306. 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009) (holding that Twombly’s standard applies to all civil
actions, not just antitrust cases).
307. In re Bill of Lading Transmission and Processing Sys. Patent, 681 F.3d 1323, 1337
(Fed. Cir. 2012).
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does not contemplate the same level of factual specificity as Twombly and
Iqbal.308 What this means is that the pleading standard for patent
infringement in districts without local patent rules is not only significantly
lower than in districts with local patent rules, but it is also lower as
compared to other types of civil claims to which Twombly and Iqbal do
apply.
While the substance of certain local patent rules is troubling, a
potentially more serious concern lies in the way these rules are
promulgated. Pursuant to FRCP 83, district courts must make local patent
rules available to the public for comment.309 Unfortunately, however,
neither comments received from the public nor minutes from committee
meetings appear to be readily accessible. Of the thirty district courts that
have adopted local patent rules, none make this information available on
their websites. Indeed, after contacting each of the thirty district courts, only
seven provided copies of the comments.310 Four of the courts stated that the
comments received are not made public,311 three explained that any
comments received were not archived by the court,312 and four said that they
received no comments on the local patent rules.313 The remaining courts
failed to respond to the inquiry.
There also is very little known about who might be advising district
courts regarding their local patent rules. Although some districts publicly
identify members of their Patent Local Rules Advisory Committees,314 the
308. Id. at 1334–35. Recently, the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules recommended
the abrogation of FRCP 84 and the official forms, including Form 18. See COMM. ON RULES OF
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 60 (May 29–
30, 2014). If the Supreme Court follows the Committee’s recommendation, and Congress
acquiesces, the rule changes will become effective at the end of 2015.
309. FED. R. CIV. P. 83.
310. The courts are the Northern District of Indiana, Eastern District of New York,
Southern District of New York, Western District of New York, Western District of North
Carolina, Southern District of Ohio, and District of Utah.
311. The courts are the Northern District of Illinois, District of Maryland, District of New
Hampshire, and District of New Jersey.
312. The courts are the Northern District of California, Southern District of California, and
District of Minnesota.
313. The courts are the District of Idaho, Northern District of New York, Northern District
of Ohio, and Eastern District of Washington.
314. See Local Rules Attorney Advisory Committees, U.S. DIST. COURT, N. DIST. OF CAL.,
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/pages/1014 (last visited Mar. 15, 2015) (identifying members);
2005 Patent Advisory Committee’s Preface, U.S. DIST. COURT, DIST. OF MINN.,
http://www.mnd.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/public_comment.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2015)
(identifying members); Northern District of Illinois Judges Propose Local Patent Rules, U.S.
DIST.
COURT,
N.
DIST.
OF
ILL.
(Mar.
23,
2009),
http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/_assets/_documents/Rules/Patent%20Rls%20Press.pdf
(identifying members); Northern District of Illinois Local Patent Rules for Electronically Stored
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vast majority do not.315 We are left instead with only anecdotal evidence
suggesting that district judges and lawyers often work together on local
patent rules.316 But who are these lawyers and what types of clients do they
represent? Are courts hearing from a cross-section of the patent community
or are the advisors representative of a single industry or type of patent
litigant? Are courts hearing from a geographically diverse group of
lawyers—since patent practice tends to be nationwide—or just the local
patent bar?
A recent example from the District of Delaware is illustrative. Over the
past year or so, Judges Stark and Robinson participated in a Patent Study
Group (PSG) to identify “best practices” for the management of patent
cases in their district.317 As a result of the PSG, both judges revised their
local-local rules for patent cases.318 Considering the prominence of the
District of Delaware, and that Judges Stark and Robinson constitute half the
court, these are significant developments for patent litigants. Yet, the only
publicly available information about the PSG is contained in a PowerPoint
presentation delivered by Judge Stark to the Intellectual Property Section of

Information,
U.S.
DIST.
COURT,
N.
DIST.
OF
ILL.
(Mar.
1,
2013),
http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/_assets/_news/Local%20Patent%20Rules.pdf (identifying
members); Report of the Local Patent Rules Committee, U.S. DIST. COURT, DIST. OF N.J. 4–5
(Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.njd.uscourts.gov/sites/njd/files/PatentRuleAmendment2011.pdf
(identifying members).
315. Five districts—Idaho, Indiana Northern, North Carolina Middle, Ohio Southern, and
Utah—provide public information about the members of their local rules committees, but it is
not clear that these are the same individuals advising on local patent rules.
316. See, e.g., Tony Lathrop, Federal District Courts Continue to Use Local Patent Rules,
MVA LITIGATION BLOG (Sept. 13, 2013), http://blogs.mvalaw.com/litigation-law-blog/federaldistrict-courts-continue-to-use-local-patent-rules/; Jerome B. Simandle, Litigation in New Jersey
Under the New Local Patent Rules, N.J. LAW. 27 (June 2009) (“Extensive collaboration
between the bench and the bar led to the writing and adoption of the New Jersey Local Patent
Rules.”).
317. Court Announces Patent Study Group, U.S. DIST. COURT, DIST. OF DEL.,
http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/news/court-announces-patent-study-group (last visited Mar. 15,
2015).
318. Hon. Leonard P. Stark, Revised Procedures for Managing Patent Cases, Patent
Procedures
USCOURTS
(June
18,
2004),
http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Chambers/LPS/PatentProcs/LPSPatentProcedures.pdf (“As a result of the invaluable discussions in which I participated as part
of the District of Delaware’s Patent Study Group . . . I describe below the Revised Procedures
that I will follow in handling patent cases.”); Denise Seastone Kraft & Brian Biggs, Judge
Robinson Revises Her Procedures: How Will Patent Litigation Change in Delaware? Top
Points,
DLA
PIPER
(Apr.
2,
2014),
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2014/04/judge-robinson-revises-herprocedures/ (explaining that changes stem from PSG that Judges Robinson and Leonard Stark
“spearheaded”).
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the District of Delaware Chapter of the Federal Bar Association. 319 In that
presentation, Judge Stark indicated that between January and March 2014,
he and Judge Robinson met with the PSG in twenty separate sessions and
engaged in fifteen hours of “off-the-record” discussions.320 Judge Stark
further disclosed that the PSG consisted of more than 120 attorneys from
various law firms and companies.321 Although Judge Stark identified the law
firms322 and noted that a cross-section of industry sectors was represented,323
he did not name the companies or the individual lawyers who were part of
the PSG. Nor was there any explanation as to why or how these particular
attorneys were invited to participate in these important discussions. Such a
lack of transparency compromises the integrity of the rulemaking process
and raises questions about whether certain interest groups might be unduly
influencing local patent rules.
In the end, trans-territorial and trans-substantive uniformity were lofty
but worthy goals of the FRCP. Unfortunately, neither of these goals is being
realized in patent litigation today. The final Part of this Article sets out a
proposal to fix the current fractured state of our patent procedural system.
While admittedly not ideal (i.e., it proposes substance-specific rather than
trans-substantive procedures for patent cases), my proposal is timely,
provides for a neutral, deliberative process, and should appeal to a broad
range of stakeholders.

319. Hon. Leonard P. Stark, Patent Study Group, USCOURTS (May 13, 2014),
http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/news/presentation-honorable-leonard-p-stark-findings-patentstudy-group. We contacted the librarian at the District of Delaware who confirmed that this
presentation is the only resource regarding the PSG.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. The law firms included Ashby & Geddes; Bayard; Cravath, Swain & Moore;
Desmarais; DLA Piper; Farnan; Finnegan, Henderson, Garrett & Dunner; Fitzpatrick, Cella,
Harper & Scinto; Fish & Richardson; Fox Rothschild; Mayer Brown; McDermott, Will &
Emery; Morris James; Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell; Morrison & Foerster; Novak, Druce,
Connolly, Bove & Quigg; Paul Hastings; Potter, Anderson & Corroon; Proctor Heyman; Ratner
Prestia; Richards, Layton & Finger; Seitz, Ross, Aronstam & Moritz; Shaw Keller; Stamoulis &
Weinblatt; Susman Godfrey; Weil, Gotshal & Manges; WilmerHale; Womble, Carlyle,
Sandridge & Rice; Young, Conaway, Stargatt, & Taylor. Id. Notably, of the twenty-nine firms
that participated in the PSG, more than half of them are Delaware firms or are national firms
with Delaware offices.
323. The industries represented included NPE, telecommunications, internet, consumer
electronics, and branded and generic pharmaceuticals. Id.
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THE FEDERAL RULES OF PATENT PROCEDURE324

Over the past seventy-five years, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
have certainly been subject to criticism. Commentators have challenged the
trans-substantive model,325 the bias against localism,326 the process through
which the Rules are amended,327 and the notion that rules drafted for simple
diversity cases remain effective in today’s complex world of federal civil
litigation.328 So far, however, the FRCP have withstood the test of time.329
Perhaps this staying power alone should convince us that the FRCP are
the solution to the patent procedure crisis. We could simply throw out all
the local patent rules, declare that patent cases will be controlled exclusively
by the FRCP, and return to simpler times. To be sure, patent law—an area
dominated by specialization—could benefit from having generalist judges
apply generalist rules.330 Moreover, with only the FRCP in play, patent
litigation would be simpler and less expensive because lawyers would not
have to spend time discovering, understanding, and complying with local
rules.331
Arguably, there is no better time than the present to let the FRCP—and
the FRCP alone—dictate procedure in patent cases.
The Judicial
Conference recently recommended for approval a series of amendments to
the FRCP that address many of the perceived problems in patent
litigation.332 For example, the amendments propose abrogation of FRCP 84
and Form 18, which should restore uniformity to patent law with respect to
pleading. The amendments would also alter the scope of discovery to
324. Ware & Davy, supra note 6, at 1014.
325. Robert G. Bone, Securing the Normative Foundations of Litigation Reform, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 1155, 1160–63 (2006); Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court,
Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 713–15 (1988); Robert M.
Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718,
718 (1975).
326. Jordan, supra note 29, at 416.
327. See Freer, supra note 101, at 448; Lonny Hoffman, Rulemaking in the Age of
Twombly and Iqbal, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1483, 1487 (2013).
328. Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 26, at 508–14; Marcus, supra note 44, at 372.
329. See supra Part IV.C (explaining that most FRCP and local rules are trans-substantive
in nature).
330. See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE
L.J. 616, 667 n.162 (2013) (describing the debate over generalist and specialist judges and
explaining that some commentators believe “immersion and insularity can in fact render
specialists’ decisions inferior to generalists’”). But see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized
Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377, 378 (arguing that a “specialized court’s sustained
involvement with a field would facilitate superior decisionmaking”).
331. See Sisk, supra note 113, at 26–30.
332. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE (Sept. 2014).
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incorporate a proportionality analysis, and allow for more liberal cost
shifting in discovery. It stands to reason that, in the patent context, these
proposed discovery changes will empower alleged infringers to fight patent
suits on the merits instead of being forced into unwarranted settlements due
to sky-high discovery costs.333
Even if the proposed amendments become law, however, the reality is
that the FRCP still won’t address some of the most important aspects of
patent litigation, such as claim construction. Nor will amending the FRCP
change the fact that federal district courts across the country are riddled
with local patent rules—some “official,” some not—many of which have
been in place for more than a decade now. What is clear is that local patent
rules should not simply be ignored or rejected. Rather, reformers should
interpret these local rules as a signal that the national rules governing
procedure in patent litigation are deficient and ought to be fixed.334
A.

Justification for the Federal Rules of Patent Procedure

There is consensus that our patent litigation system is broken, but the
question is what to do about it. This Article proposes the promulgation of
the Federal Rules of Patent Procedure—a uniform set of federal procedural
rules that would apply to all patent cases filed in any of the ninety-four
district courts. While substance-specific federal rules are rare,335 I believe
the priority for patent litigation at this point should be trans-territorial
uniformity so that patent cases nationwide are treated similarly, forum
shopping is dampened, and outcomes of patent suits are normalized.336
The proliferation of local patent rules speaks for itself: patent litigation
calls for specialized procedural rules. In many ways, patent litigation
resembles other types of complex federal civil litigation. Yet, there are a
few oddities that set patent cases apart from other lawsuits and justify the
use of specialized procedural rules. Claim construction provides the main
impetus for specialized patent rules. Claim construction occurs in virtually
333. See Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 VAND. L. REV.
375, 431 (2014).
334. Rosenthal, Summary Changes, supra note 13, at 484 (“Such a patchwork of local rules
in an area that the national rules occupy may . . . indicate deficiencies in the national rule.”).
335. See supra note 293 (discussing Professor Marcus’s study).
336. See John B. Oakley, An Open Letter on Reforming the Process of Revising the Federal
Rules, 55 MONT. L. REV. 435, 445 (1994) (“[G]eographical uniformity is more important than
trans-substantive application of the federal rules, since deviations from trans-substantive
uniformity can be provided for by express provisions and exceptions within the rules, but
geographical disuniformity promotes forum-shopping, increases the risk of inadvertent mistake,
and thereby increases both inefficiency and potential unfairness.”).
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every patent case and is considered the most critical aspect of patent
litigation.337 Its importance is evidenced by the fact that most patent cases
either settle or resolve on summary judgment once claim construction is
complete.338 Claim construction differs from statutory or contractual
construction because the court must determine how a skilled artisan at the
time of the invention, not the judge, would interpret the claim. 339 Because
claim construction is so crucial to patent litigation and is truly unique to this
class of cases, uniform procedures governing this process are not only
appropriate but long overdue.340
Another reason patent cases deserve special procedural treatment is
because of the complicated technologies involved, which impact myriad
aspects of patent litigation. There will be discovery surrounding the
technology,341 experts opining about the technology,342 a special master may

337. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to
Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1059 (2003) (“Claim construction is often
determinative of all other questions in the case.”); Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and
Interpretation of Claims—American Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L.
497, 499 (1990).
338. See Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 101, 104 (2005).
339. See Harold C. Wegner, Interlocutory Claim Construction Appeals: A Better
Legislative Solution, 3 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 211, 217–18 (2009); see also Kristen Osenga,
Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 61, 65–68 (2006) (suggesting
additional reasons why “district court judges, most of whom are skilled at similar tasks of
contract interpretation and statutory construction, are getting claim construction so wrong”).
340. Compare Ballard Med. Prods. v. Allegiance Healthcare Corp., 268 F.3d 1352, 1358
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Markman does not require a district court to follow any particular procedure
in conducting claim construction.”), with Kenneth C. Bass III, The Sedona Conference Report
on the Markman Process, 7 SEDONA CONF. J. 205, 206 (2006) (“Many experienced patent
litigators have expressed concern about the wide diversity among judges with regard to the
conduct of Markman hearings.”). Arguably, the recent decision in Teva Pharma. USA, Inc. v.
Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831 (2015), makes the need for uniform claim construction procedures
even more compelling. Teva held that factual disputes regarding claim construction should be
reviewed for clear error, while legal questions should continue to be reviewed de novo. Id. at
835. This means that district judges will generally be the final arbiters of factual questions
related to claim construction. Thus, prescribing certain procedures for all district courts to
follow will reduce disuniformity in claim construction (which the Federal Circuit is less able to
do post-Teva) and minimize the incentive to forum shop.
341. See, e.g., Matthew J. Dowd et al., Nanotechnology and the Best Mode, 2
NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 238, 251 (2005) (noting that parties must rely on discovery to
obtain inventor’s laboratory notebooks).
342. See, e.g., Edward G. Poplawski, Selection and Use of Experts in Patent Cases, 27
AIPLA Q.J., Winter 1999, at 1, 3 (“It is axiomatic that technical experts are virtually a sine qua
non for patent litigation . . . .”); Greg R. Vetter, Patent Law’s Unpredictability Doctrine and the
Software Arts, 76 MO. L. REV. 763, 800 (2011) (discussing the use of experts in patent
litigation).
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be engaged to help with the technology,343 and perhaps the parties will
provide the judge a tutorial on the technology.344 Of course, if the case goes
to trial, the jury will have to be educated on the technology too. 345 Patent
litigation, which is likely to involve increased technological complexity
over time, would benefit from national procedural rules aimed at
standardizing and streamlining the discovery, explanation, and presentation
of technology.
The Federal Rules of Patent Procedure also make good sense because
uniformity holds a special place in patent law. The Federal Circuit was
created for the express purpose of bringing uniformity and predictability to
patent law.346 Uniformity, it was believed, would “strengthen the United
States patent system in such a way as to foster technological growth and
industrial innovation.”347 The Federal Circuit’s enabling legislation was
silent on how procedural issues in patent cases should be treated, and the
courts have struggled with that question ever since.348 The time has come
for this problem finally to be resolved.
B.

A Policy Window for the Federal Rules of Patent Procedure

The patent procedure conundrum—meaning what procedural law should
apply to patent cases—is not new. The Federal Circuit recognized this
problem early in its history, and scholars have been debating it for two
decades now.349 But “timing is everything,” as the adage goes, and a
confluence of circumstances surrounding our patent system has opened a
policy window for patent procedural reform. A policy window, as described
in the political science literature, is an opportunity to pass new laws based
343. See, e.g., Josh Hartman et al., Counsel Courts Keep: Judicial Reliance on Special
Masters, Court-Appointed Experts, and Technical Advisors in Patent Cases, 14 SEDONA CONF.
J. 61, 61–62 (2013) (“Courts have inherent authority to engage special masters, court-appointed
expert witnesses, and technical advisors who may help explain the technology . . . .”).
344. See, e.g., Chief Judge Leonard P. Stark, supra note 186, at Judge Stark’s Scheduling
Order for Patent Cases ¶ 10 (rev. July 2014) (requiring parties to provide court with a tutorial on
the technology); U.S. Dist. Court, N. Dist. of Cal., Judge Davila’s Standing Order for Patent
Cases ¶ IV, http://cand.uscourts.gov/ejdorders (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
345. See Poplawski, supra note 342, at 3 (explaining that experts are used in patent
litigation to explain the technology to the jury).
346. See, e.g., Control Res., Inc. v. Delta Elec., Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 121, 123 (D. Mass.
2001) (“The Federal Circuit is different. Unlike the other circuit courts of appeal, the Federal
Circuit came into being, in part, pursuant to an express Congressional mandate to foster
uniformity in the application of the law of patents.”).
347. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 571–72 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (en banc).
348. See supra Part III.A (discussing procedure in patent cases).
349. See supra Part III.B (canvassing scholarship on the choice of law issue).
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on recent events, such as a major crisis or high-profile scandal.350 Policy
windows can also open because of “a change in the administration, a shift in
the partisan or ideological distribution of seats in Congress, a shift in the
national mood,” or—as is the case with patent litigation—“because a new
problem captures the attention of government officials and those close to
them.”351
All three branches of the federal government (and even some states) are
currently focused on patent litigation reform.352 Beginning in May 2013,
close to a dozen bills aimed at curbing “patent litigation abuse” were
introduced in Congress.353 These bills proposed a number of procedural
reforms for patent litigation including, but not limited to, heightened
pleading standards, the elimination of Form 18, limitations on discovery,
and expanded fee-shifting authority.354 Interestingly, there was substantial
overlap between the proposed bills and local patent rules on issues like
pleading standards and discovery. Yet, the legislation said nothing about
local patent rules or how they might be affected by these new laws.
While the proposed legislation enjoyed broad support from a cross
section of industries,355 some companies, universities, and small inventors
expressed serious reservations.356 They worried that the proposed legislation
was too broad and would weaken the rights of legitimate innovators, not
350. See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES AND PUBLIC POLICIES 1, 165–67 (2d
ed. 2011).
351. Id. at 176.
352. See, e.g., Ryan Davis, Troll Bills Would Usurp Courts’ Power, Fed. Circ. Judge Says,
LAW 360 (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/476345/troll-bills-would-usurpcourts-power-fed-circ-judge-says; Tony Dutra, NY Agrees to Terms with Patent Troll MPHJ,
Firm Fights Back with Lawsuit Against FTC, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 15, 2014),
http://www.bna.com/ny-agrees-terms-n17179881379/; Timothy B. Lee, Obama Administration:
No Time to Waste on Patent Reform, WASH POST, Nov. 15, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/11/15/obama-administration-notime-to-waste-on-patent-reform/.
353. Matt Levy, Patent Progress’s Guide to Patent Reform Legislation, PATENT PROGRESS
(Jan. 12, 2014), http://www.patentprogress.org/2014/1/12/patent-progresss-guide-to-patentreform-legislation/.
354. See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); Patent
Transparency and Improvements Act, S. 1720, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); Patent Abuse
Reduction Act, S. 1013, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); Patent Litigation Integrity Act, S. 1612,
113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
355. See, e.g., 50 Organizations Send Letter to Congressional Leadership Urging Solutions
to
Patent
Abuse,
PATENT
FAIRNESS
(July
17,
2013),
http://www.patentfairness.org/media/press/50-organizations-send-letter-to-congressionalleadership-urging-solutions-to-patent-abuse.
356. See, e.g., Tony Dutra, Senate Patent Litigation Reform Hearing Calls for More
Deliberate
Approach
than
House,
BLOOMBERG
BNA
(Dec.
18,
2013),
http://www.bna.com/senate-patent-litigation-n17179880853/.
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just PAEs.357 The House nonetheless passed one of these bills
(Representative Goodlatte’s Innovation Act) by a vote of 325 to 91 in
December 2013,358 and for a short time it looked like the Senate would
move on the bills too.359 Then opposition mounted, especially from trial
lawyers,360 and the Senate Democrats tabled the legislation.361 It appeared
that Congress’s interest in patent reform may wane, but recent events
suggest the policy window remains wide open. The 2014 midterm elections
resulted in a power shift with Republicans taking control of the Senate and
quickly declaring patent reform a high priority.362 Now the Innovation Act
has been reintroduced in the House, and patent litigation reform is back on
the legislative agenda.363
The Executive has also been intent on patent litigation reform. To be
sure, during last year’s State of the Union address, President Obama called
on Congress to “pass a patent reform bill that allows our businesses to stay

357. See id.
358. Press Release, U.S. House of Rep. Judiciary Comm., House Passes Innovation Act to
Make
Reforms
to
Our
Patent
System
(Dec.
5,
2013),
http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/2013/12/house-passes-innovation-act-to-make-reforms-toour-patent-system.
359. See, e.g., Michael Rosen, Coryn-Schumer Patent Reform Compromise a Significant
Improvement,
TECHPOLICYDAILY.COM
(Apr.
30,
2014),
http://www.techpolicydaily.com/technology/cornyn-schumer-patent-reform-compromisesignificant-improvement/.
360. Cory L. Andrews, Trolls and Trial Lawyers Should Curb Their Enthusiasm Over
Patent
Reform
Timeout,
FORBES
(May
29,
2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2014/05/29/trolls-and-trial-lawyers-should-curb-theirenthusiasm-over-patent-reform-timeout/.
361. See, e.g., Erin Mershon & Tony Romm, Patent Reform Hits Dead End in Senate,
POLITICO (May 21, 2014), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/05/patent-reform-senate106968.html. The bills under consideration in the Senate included the Patent Transparency and
Improvements Act of 2013, S. 1720, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); Patent Abuse Reduction Act
of 2013, S. 1013, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); and Patent Litigation Integrity Act of 2013, S.
1612, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
362. Jones, supra note 21.
363. Press Release, Rep. Bob Goodlatte, Goodlatte Introduces Patent Litigation Reform Bill
(Feb. 5, 2015), available at http://goodlatte.house.gov/press_releases/660. A competing bill, the
Support Technology & Research for Our Nation’s Growth (STRONG) Patents Act, was
introduced in the Senate by Senators Coons, Durbin, and Hirono on March 3, 2015. See Press
Release, Sen. Christopher Coons, Coons, Durbin, Hirono Introduce Patent Reform Bill to
Protect
Innovation,
Confront
Abuse
(Mar.
3,
2015),
available
at
http://www.coons.senate.gov/newsroom/releases/release/coons-durbin-hirono-introduce-patentreform-bill-to-protect-innovation-confront-abuse. The proposals in the STRONG bill are much
more favorable to patent owners than the Innovation Act. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, The Strong
Patent Act of 2015 from Senator Coons, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 3, 2015),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/03/strong-patent-senator.html.
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focused on innovation, not costly, needless litigation.”364 The Executive has
also taken various actions, primarily through the PTO, to curtail abusive
patent litigation.365 For instance, the PTO’s website now includes a
“litigation” page with information about what accused infringers can do in
response to cease and desist letters or infringement suits.366
The judiciary, too, has shown an interest in patent litigation reform.
Some Federal Circuit judges, particularly former Chief Judge Radar, have
joined in the chorus for reform—albeit a different type of reform. Judge
Radar argues that courts, rather than Congress, should lead the charge. 367 In
an op-ed piece in the New York Times, Judge Radar suggested that judges
could effectively deter patent litigation abuse by shifting attorney’s fees
more readily.368 And in a speech delivered last fall, he questioned the
wisdom and need for legislation: “[b]ecause I have confidence in the ability
of the judiciary to address these issues in a more flexible and thus just
manner, I consequently encourage the legislative branch to proceed with
great caution in attempting to solve specific and evolving problems with
sweeping definitions.”369 Going a step further, Federal Circuit Judge
Kathleen O’Malley criticized the legislation as nothing more than “litigation
case management proposals” that contravene core separation of powers
principles.370 The discord over the proposed legislation—not to mention its
364. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 2014 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 50 (Jan. 28, 2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/01/28/president-barack-obamas-state-union-address.
365. See White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Executive Actions: Answering the
President’s Call to Strengthen Our Patent System and Foster Innovation, WHITEHOUSE.GOV
(Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/02/20/fact-sheet-executiveactions-answering-president-s-call-strengthen-our-p.
366. Been Sued or Gotten a Demand Letter? Answers To Common Questions About
Abusive Patent Litigation, U.S. PATENTS & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/patentsmaintaining-patent/patent-litigation/patent-litigation (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
367. See Randall R. Rader et al., Make Patent Trolls Pay in Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 5,
2013, at A25, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/make-patent-trolls-payin-court.html.
368. Id. Interestingly, at the time Judge Radar wrote the op-ed, Federal Circuit precedent
made it difficult to shift attorney’s fees in patent cases, but since then, the Supreme Court has
made that easier. See generally Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct.
1744 (2014) (holding that “an appellate court should apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in
reviewing all aspects of a district court’s § 285 determination”); Octane Fitness, L.L.C. v. ICON
Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014) (holding that an award of attorney's fees under §
285 is appropriate in “exceptional cases,” meaning cases that stand out from others).
369. Randall R. Rader, former Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, Texas Bar Association Keynote: Patent Law and Litigation Abuse (Nov. 1,
2013), available at http://mcsmith.blogs.com/files/rader-2013-ed-tex-bb-speech.pdf.
370. Davis, supra note 352 (“‘Once you intrude on the inherent authority of courts to
actually manage each case before them, you’re breaking down the division between the
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failure to pass last year—intimates that an alternative solution like the one
proposed in this Article would be welcomed by many.
Another key factor contributing to this policy window for comprehensive
patent procedural reform is that the local patent rules experiment is well
underway. The experiment has been percolating for fifteen years now with
thirty district courts in twenty different states adopting official local patent
rules, and many other district judges utilizing specialized procedures in
patent cases.371 It is widely recognized that a key benefit of local rulemaking
is that district courts can serve as laboratories to experiment with different
approaches and procedures.372 Yet, experiments, by definition, must come to
an end. To be clear, I am not advocating for the immediate revocation of all
local patent rules. Instead, as discussed further below, I submit that a
sufficient amount of time has passed to begin the process of collecting data
regarding patent cases subject to local patent rules so that rule makers can
analyze the efficacy, workability, and sustainability of those rules.373
To some extent, this data collection process has already begun through
the Patent Pilot Program, further underscoring my claim of an open policy
window. Congress established the Patent Pilot Program in 2011 “to
encourage enhancement of expertise in patent cases among district
judges.”374 The legislation provided that district courts meeting certain
criteria—namely, those having a busy patent docket or local patent rules—
could be designated as Patent Pilot Program courts.375 Accordingly, fourteen
district courts were chosen to participate in the program, twelve of which

branches of government, and there is grave danger in doing that.’”) (quoting Judge O’Malley’s
speech at a conference in Washington, D.C. sponsored by the Innovation Alliance).
371. See supra note 175 (listing the districts with local patent rules).
372. See Rosenthal, Summary Changes, supra note 13, at 492 (“The benefit of having
district and division local rules serve as laboratory experiments to test different approaches also
became clear.”); Levin, supra note 92, at 1567 (approving of Rule 83’s creation of “local
laboratories”).
373. See, e.g., Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms, 146 F.R.D.
401, 533 (1993) (explaining that, under the Civil Justice Reform Act, district courts were
authorized to adopt local rules inconsistent with the FRCP for a period of five years to
“provide[] a sound basis for potentially useful experimentation”); Act of Jan. 4, 2011, Pub. L.
No. 111-349, § 1, 124 Stat. 3674, 3674 (codified at 28 USC § 137) (providing that the program
will run for ten years and that Congress will collect data over that time period to assess the
success of the program).
374. § 1, 124 Stat. 3674, 3674; see also Press Release, U.S. Courts, District Courts Selected
for
Patent
Pilot
Program
(June,
7,
2011),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/11-0607/District_Courts_Selected_for_Patent_Pilot_Program.aspx.
375. Press Release, U.S. Courts, supra note 374.
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have comprehensive local patent rules in place.376 Beginning in mid-2011
and continuing for ten years, judges in those districts will be selected to take
on a disproportionate share of patent cases.377 Data will then be gathered by
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, reported to Congress, and
analyzed to determine, among other things, the efficacy of the program in
developing expertise and improving efficiency in patent litigation.378 The
first periodic report indicates that the program has been implemented
successfully in the fourteen districts, but that it is “too early to draw any
conclusions from the pilot data currently available.”379
C.

Promulgating the Federal Rules of Patent Procedure

The patent reform legislation currently pending before Congress has
sparked controversy about whose job it is to enact procedural rules for
patent cases.380 District courts and individual judges have assumed that
responsibility thus far, with the result being substantial fragmentation of
patent procedure. That raises the question of how to fix the problem. One
option is for Congress to pass the Innovation Act or some similar legislation

376. Id. The fourteen districts selected were: California (Central, Northern, and Southern);
Florida (Southern); Illinois (Northern); Maryland; Nevada; New Jersey; New York (Eastern and
Southern); Pennsylvania (Western); Tennessee (Western); Texas (Eastern and Northern). Id. Of
those districts, only the Central District of California and Southern District of Florida do not
have local patent rules. See supra note 175 (listing courts with local patent rules).
377. § 1(a), 124 Stat. 3674, 3674.
378. Id. at § 1(e).
379. Patent Pilot Project: Status Update (Feb. 2013) (on file with author). Interestingly, in
September 2014, the Southern District of Florida ended its participation in the Patent Pilot
Program. See John Pacenti, South Florida Federal Courts End Pilot Patent Program, DAILY
BUS.
REV.
(Sept.
8,
2014),
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:D7pBJvLwEPgJ:www.dailybusinessre
view.com/id%3D1202669306885/South-Florida-Federal-Courts-End-Pilot-PatentProgram+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us. So far, it does not appear that another district has
been selected to take its place.
380. I do not mean to suggest that this is the only criticism of the current patent reform bill.
Some biotechnology companies have opposed the Innovation Act because it “will create
additional patent-related uncertainty in the already high-risk life sciences and technology
sectors.” Chris Jennewein, Patent Law ‘Innovation’ Slammed by San Diego Biotech Groups,
TIMES OF SAN DIEGO (Feb. 6, 2015), http://timesofsandiego.com/politics/2015/02/06/san-diegobiotech-groups-criticize-federal-innovation-act/. Others argue that the legislation is simply
unnecessary because the courts have already taken steps to remedy many of the perceived
problems with patent litigation. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Litigation Reform: The Courts,
Congress, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 BOSTON U. L. REV. 279, 282 (2015).
An in-depth analysis of the merits of the Innovation Act is beyond the scope of this Article,
however.
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mandating a new set of procedural rules for patent cases.381 Putting to the
side the question whether it has the power to enact such legislation,382
Congress is ill-suited to the task of procedural rulemaking:
[L]egislatures have neither the immediate familiarity with the dayto-day practice of the courts which would allow them to isolate the
pressing problems of procedural revision nor the experience and
expertness necessary to the solution of these problems; legislatures
are intolerably slow to act and cause even the slightest and most
obviously necessary matter of procedural change to be long
delayed; legislatures are subject to the influence of other pressures
than those which seek the efficient administration of justice and
may often push through some particular and ill-advised pet project
of an influential legislator while the comprehensive, long-studied
proposal of a bar association molders in committee; and
legislatures are not held responsible in the public eye for the
efficient administration of the courts and hence do not feel pressed
to constant reexamination of procedural methods.383

These shortcomings are further compounded in the patent context since
legislators generally have little experience with innovation policy, local
patent rules, and the technologies that patents protect. So even though
Congressional action would bring uniformity to patent procedure, there are
serious downsides.
Another possibility is to take far less drastic measures and simply
recommend, rather than require, uniform procedural rules for patent cases.
Perhaps if “model” patent procedures were outlined in a guide—something
similar to the Manual for Complex Litigation—district judges nationwide
would use it, which would lead to standardization in patent procedure.384
While appealing in theory, the reality is that this approach has already been
tried. The Federal Judicial Center began publishing the Patent Case
Management Judicial Guide (PCMJG) in 2009 with the intent that it would
“become widely used by district judges as an authoritative source for best

381. Cf. supra note 167 and accompanying text (noting that Congress passed the PSLRA to
effect certain procedural reforms for securities actions).
382. See Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void
Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REV. 276 (1928); see also supra note 370 (discussing Judge
O’Malley’s claim that the current legislation violates the separation of powers doctrine).
383. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making:
A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1958).
384. See Judith Resnick, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, WalMart v. Dukes & Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 144 n.394 (2011) (explaining that the
purpose of the Manual for Complex Litigation was to standardize the procedures used in
aggregate litigation).
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practices for patent case management.”385 To date, however, courts’ use of
the PCMJG appears sporadic, leaving patent procedure in a state of
disarray.386
Because neither the Innovation Act nor the PCMJG adequately addresses
the patent procedure dilemma, this Article proposes the promulgation of the
Federal Rules of Patent Procedure—a comprehensive set of rules for patent
cases. Fortunately, the Rules Enabling Act, passed by Congress in 1934 to
permit promulgation of the FRCP, created a rulemaking process that can
serve as a model for the Federal Rules of Patent Procedure.
The Rules Enabling Act envisions rulemaking as a collaborative process
involving all three branches of government.387 The Act delegates to the
Supreme Court the power to prescribe “general rules of practice and
procedure” that do “not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” 388
The Court’s rulemaking authority, in turn, is delegated to an advisory
committee responsible for drafting and amending the rules.389 The advisory
committee is comprised of judges, lawyers, law professors, and
representatives of the executive branch, all of whom contribute expertise to
the rulemaking process.390 Minutes of the advisory committee’s meetings
are maintained and made available to the public.391 The committee also
circulates its proposals to the public for comment and holds public
hearings.392 After considering the public’s input, the committee presents its
385. Dabney Carr, Federal Judicial Center to Publish Patent Case Management Judicial
Guide, VIRGINIA IP LAW, http://virginiaiplaw.com/2009/04/federal-judicial-center-to-publishpatent-case-management-judicial-guide/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
386. Though admittedly difficult to measure, a Westlaw search reveals that the PCMJG has
been cited in surprisingly few cases since it was first published six years ago. Specifically, the
PCMJG is cited in only one Federal Circuit decision and about thirty district court decisions,
despite the fact that thousands of patent cases have been filed annually for the past several
years.
387. See Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on
Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 599 (2010) [hereinafter Carrington, Politics].
388. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2014).
389. Specifically, the Court delegates its rulemaking power to the “Judicial Conference of
the U.S. Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure, which further delegates the
responsibility to an Advisory Committee on Civil Rules.” See Allan Erbsen, From
“Predominance” to “Resolvability”: A New Approach to Regulating Class Actions, 58 VAND.
L. REV. 995, 1060 n.141 (2005).
390. See Catherine Y. Kim, Changed Circumstances: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and the Future of Institutional Reform Litigation After Horne v. Flores, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1435, 1469 (2013); John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith
Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69, 113 n.233
(2002).
391. 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (2014).
392. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate,
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proposals to the Supreme Court. If a majority of the justices promulgate the
recommended rules, Congress has a limited time (approximately seven
months) to reject, modify, or defer to them.393
This Article proposes a similar, though slightly modified, process for the
Federal Rules of Patent Procedure. As an initial matter, Congress should
pass legislation expressly providing the Supreme Court with rulemaking
authority as respects patent cases. This is the path Congress took for
bankruptcy cases,394 and would allay concerns that the Rules Enabling Act
precludes the promulgation of substance-specific procedural rules.395
Congress should also expand the Patent Pilot Program, first to add districts
without local patent rules, and second to mandate the collection of data on
local (and local-local) patent rules and their impact on patent litigation.
As with the FRCP, the Supreme Court should then delegate its
rulemaking authority to an advisory committee, and this Patent Rules
Advisory Committee (PRAC) would be primarily responsible for drafting
the Federal Rules of Patent Procedure. The composition of the PRAC
should be diverse and balanced. Like the FRCP advisory committee, PRAC
members should include judges, lawyers, law professors, and executive
branch representatives.396 Of course, some of these members should have
patent expertise. There should be room on the committee, say, for Federal
Circuit judges, district judges with significant patent experience, patent
lawyers and academics, contributors to the PCMJC, and PTO
representatives. Yet, it is vital for generalists to participate in the process as
well. Generalists, especially those with rulemaking experience, would
provide valuable perspectives and insights that would improve the overall
quality of the rules.397 More to the point, generalists would help protect
against undue political influence in the rulemaking process, which
Bankruptcy, Civil, and Criminal Procedure, USCOURTS (Apr. 15, 2014),
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/proposed-amendments.aspx
[hereinafter
Judicial Conference, Proposed Amendments].
393. 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2014).
394. See 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2014); Alan N. Resnick, The Bankruptcy Rulemaking Process,
70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 245, 246 (1996) (“It was not until 1964 that Congress expressly gave the
Supreme Court rulemaking authority with respect to bankruptcy cases.”).
395. See Burbank, Pleading, supra note 288, at 541 (“[T]he Rules Enabling Act’s reference
to ‘general rules’ forecloses the promulgation of different prospective rules for cases that
involve different bodies of substantive law.”).
396. See supra note 390 and accompanying text (discussing the make-up of the FRCP
advisory committee).
397. See Oldfather, supra note 225, at 854–59 (outlining the specialist versus generalist
debate); Mark Tushnet, State Taxation and Interstate Commerce: A Generalist’s View of
Today’s Terrain, 2007 ST. & LOC. TAX LAW. 255, 255 (“The generalist’s perspective is
important to specialists . . . [because] stepping back from the details often allow a lawyer to see
her problems differently.”).
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historically has been one of the prime objections to substance-specific
rules.398 It would also improve upon the process used for local patent rules,
which is not only opaque but, from what little we know, quite insular in that
local patent rules are shaped almost exclusively by patent specialists.399
Even among the patent experts, PRAC members should represent a
cross-section of viewpoints. The patent system has a broad range of
stakeholders including inventors, patent owners, and accused infringers, to
name just a few. Inventors might be individuals or corporations; patent
owners include universities, PAEs, and companies big and small; and
manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and end users are all potential patent
infringers.400 The patent system is also divided by industry, such as
automotive, biotechnology, computer hardware, electronics, medical
devices,
pharmaceutical,
semiconductor,
software,
and
401
telecommunications.
The more the rulemaking process takes these
divergent viewpoints into account, the better the chances for fair-handed,
outcome-neutral procedural rules for patent cases.402
Meanwhile, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and Federal
Judicial Center should gather data regarding patent procedure through the
Patent Pilot Program and the PCMJG.403 Based on the data, studies should
398. See Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61
OKLA. L. REV. 319, 333 n.51 (2008) (“[O]thers fear that tailoring procedural rules to substance
will trigger intense political controversy and possibly paralyze the rulemaking process.”);
Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for Selective
Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27, 53 (1994) (“The third objection to
substance-specific procedure is that, historically, those who have wanted procedural change
have had political agendas and as a result, rulemaking will become a nonneutral, political
arena.”); Wolff, supra note 82, at 1032 (“In discussions of procedural reform, the principle of
trans-substantivity has also performed a political function, serving at times to deflect targeted
efforts to accomplish social ends through the mechanism of procedure.”).
399. See supra note 314 (naming members of patent local rules advisory committee, most
of whom specialize in intellectual property).
400. See generally Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex
Patent Ecosystem and its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297 (2010)
(discussing the various players in the patent system).
401. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1575, 1668 (2003) (discussing how patent law can be tailored to meet the needs of
particular industries).
402. See Coe, supra note 198 (quoting Judge Guilford of the Central District of California
as saying that patent rules should be outcome-neutral and should not “favor[] one side or the
other”).
403. Act of Jan. 4, 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-349, § 1(e), 124 Stat. 3674, 3675 (codified at 28
USC § 137), (discussing data collection and reports to Congress); Carrington, Politics, supra
note 387, at 599 (explaining that the Federal Judicial Center plays a role in the rulemaking
process by providing “empirical data informing rulemakers about the consequences of the rules
for which they share responsibility”).
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be conducted to determine, among other things, the effects of local patent
rules on patent litigation. Do local patent rules speed up or slow down
patent suits? How does the timing of claim construction influence
outcomes? Do some patent rules favor patent owners while others favor
accused infringers?404 Are these local patent rules purely procedural or are
they actually substantive and therefore matters for Congress?405 Much of
this data is already available because local patent rules have been in place
for quite some time now. Plus, the Patent Pilot Program is scheduled to run
for at least six more years, providing ample time for data collection and
analysis.406
Once the data is gathered and studied, it should be shared with and
considered by the PRAC in drafting the Federal Rules of Patent Procedure.
The PRAC’s rulemaking process should be transparent like the FRCP
process.407 Minutes of PRAC meetings should be maintained and publicly
distributed; the PRAC should share its draft rules with the public for
comments and any comments received should be available for review; and
the PRAC should hold public hearings so stakeholders have an opportunity
to express their views on the proposed rules.408 This would be a marked
improvement over the current local patent rules system where publicly
available information is extremely scarce.409 Increasing transparency in this
way would enhance the legitimacy both of the rulemaking process and the
rules themselves.
The PRAC would then transmit the proposed Federal Rules of Patent
Procedure to the Supreme Court for approval. If the Court promulgates the
rules and Congress defers, the Federal Rules of Patent Procedure will
become law in all ninety-four district courts. This means the same
procedural framework will apply to all patent cases no matter whether they
are filed in California, Florida, Texas, or Wisconsin. Under the Federal
Circuit’s choice of law doctrine,410 moreover, its law would govern the

404. See supra Part IV.B (discussing how the Northern District of California’s patent rules
favor defendants while the Eastern District of Texas’s rules favor plaintiffs).
405. See, e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on
Dodson’s Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 215, 224 (2008).
406. See § 1(a), 124 Stat. 3674, 3674.
407. See supra notes 387–93 and accompanying text.
408. See Judicial Conference, Proposed Amendments, supra note 392 (making public
comments and transcripts from public hearings on proposed amendments to the FRCP
available).
409. See supra notes 309–13 and accompanying text (explaining the difficulties
encountered in gathering public comments from the courts that have enacted Local Patent
Rules).
410. See supra Part III.B.
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application and interpretation of the Federal Rules of Patent Procedure,
furthering the goals of uniformity and predictability in patent law.
CONCLUSION
Our patent litigation system currently faces a crisis of confidence due in
large part to perceived procedural deficiencies in pleading standards,
discovery, and claim construction practice. Over the past two decades,
district courts and individual judges have taken it upon themselves to
address these problems through local patent rules. Yet, local solutions to
national problems can create even bigger problems: disuniformity,
inconsistency, and forum-shopping. For patent law, where uniformity is
paramount, the costs of local patent rules outweigh the benefits. A national
set of patent procedural rules—the Federal Rules of Patent Procedure—is a
better solution.

